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THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL DYNASTIES IN THE BALKANS

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Description

Both occupied and satellite countries are ruled by royal families of varying origin and political behavior. All five dynasties present a problem for Allied PW and for post-war plans in the Balkan areas. This report describes the historical record of each dynasty and investigates its present popularity with its people.

26 April 1944

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SUMMARY

During the nineteenth century all the Balkan countries except Albania achieved their independence from Turkish domination. All, for one reason or another, adopted constitutional monarchy as their form of government, and Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania imported their dynasties from Germany. These countries have had varying experiences with their foreign rulers and with their constitutions.

In Greece, the first German prince was removed because of his absolutism, and replaced by the scion of a Danish family, which has been popular only at rare intervals, and is now, in the person of George II, detested. George's association with the Metaxas fascist regime and his unwillingness to give guarantees not to return to the country before a plebiscite has been held have turned the Greeks against him almost to a man. Of Bulgaria's three monarchs, only the late King Boris became in the public mind a national symbol; his foreign policy, his death, and the increase of pro-Russian sentiment, may prove to have destroyed the value of the Bulgarian royal family as a unifying institution. In Rumania, the contempt for royalty created by the behavior of Carol may have been mitigated by the present pro-Allied sentiments of Michael. The dynasty's chances of survival in general seem good, largely because political corruption and the absence of an educated electorate would render it difficult for a republic to be created.

Serbia and Montenegro each had a native dynasty; the Serbs indeed had two, which alternated irregularly until 1903. With the triumph of the Allies in the first World War and the break-up of the Habsburg Empire, the Serbian Karageorgevitches became the rulers over Croats, Slovenes, and Montenegrins as

well as Serbs. The centralizing tendency of the Yugoslav monarchy alienated the Croats; its authoritarian methods alienated liberals and radicals, Serb, Croat, and Slovene alike. In March 1941, at the time of the coup d'etat which brought him to power and precipitated the German invasion, young King Peter, by indicating his intention to follow a new course, might have consolidated permanently the position of the Karageorgeviches. Over the last three years, however, the pan-Serb and anti-democratic tendencies of his advisers have cost Peter much popular support, and have lent strength to the powerful Partisan movement, which is anti-monarchical, and which appears to be gaining control of Yugoslavia.

Albania, last to be freed, in 1914 and again in 1928 became a monarchy. Zog, its most recent ruler, now in exile, inherited the corrupt practices and violence of Turkish administration, but assisted the material advance of his primitive country. Had he not connived in Italian penetration, he might have retained popularity in exile; as it is, his return is at best problematical.

I. GREECE

On the institution of monarchy in Greece certain general observations may be made. Neither the throne as an institution nor its several incumbents have so integrated themselves into the traditions and affections of the people as to occasion a sense of loss or of guilt in the abolition of the throne or the banishment of its occupant. The institution has, in fact, been as alien as its incumbents, an anomaly in a country quickened into life by egalitarian strivings and the memory of its democratic past. Nor have the kings of the Hellenes been content to serve as a national symbol and abstain from interference with popular liberties. On the contrary, in the exercise of their personal power the kings have frequently been oppressive and have defied the will of the people. Greek kings have so often been required to yield to the decision of a plebiscite that such a procedure does not have the revolutionary implications it might carry in a country with a more stable kingship. On the other hand, a certain volatility, frequently remarked by observers within the Greek body politic has occasionally led the people to support monarchy as an alternative to government by political leaders who have become unpopular. This happened in 1920 and again in 1935.

The history of monarchy in Greece reflects the interest of its sponsoring powers in that country, and the Greeks themselves have tended to value their kings for their effectiveness as instruments of diplomacy rather than for their domestic administration. Koraes, who embodied the intellectual and doctrinaire ferment which was expressed in the revolution of the 1820's, turned to Thomas Jefferson for counsel. Jefferson

left the question whether the Greek executive should be elective or "more stable" and "his office more permanent" to be determined by the position of Greece "among the warring powers of Europe." The motives of the protecting powers who were guardians of Greek independence in the London Protocol of 22 March 1829 -- Tory England, Czarist Russia, and Bourbon France -- were not identical with the aspirations of Rhigas' ebullient revolutionaries; nevertheless the diplomatic representatives of these powers recognized that it would be "unfair and dangerous" to depart from the representative system to which the country had become accustomed under Ottoman rule, and urged that the hereditary monarchy, which they recommended as the most desirable regime for Greece, should be tempered by "the democratic principle" (Protocol of 3 February 1830).

Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (subsequently King of the Belgians), whose candidacy for the kingship was first urged, declined, apparently because of the gloomy picture of Greece drawn for him by Capodistria, the Greek leader, who also insisted on unpalatable constitutional limitations. The next choice was Otho Wittelsbach, the seventeen-year old son of the King of Bavaria. This choice was dictated in part by the feeling that Germany would not be likely to interfere in the affairs of Greece, and that the selection would therefore be entirely neutral.

Attempts by the Capodistrians to formulate a constitution to which the ruler to be designated would subscribe proved abortive. In default of a constitution emanating from the people and conferring certain powers on the crown as one of several organs of the state, it was now left to the iniative of the crown to decide whether and to what extent the nation

would be admitted to a share in its own governance. By the treaty of 7 May 1832 "the hereditary sovereignty of Greece" was offered "by the courts of France, Great Britain, and Russia, duly authorized thereto by the Greek nation," to Prince Otho, and was accepted on his behalf by his father, the king of Bavaria. The tutelage of the powers was transferred to a regency to be appointed, for the duration of the King's minority, by the King of Bavaria. The treaty provided that interest and amortization charges for a loan to be contracted by Otho should have first lien on the receipts of the Greek treasury. It also authorized the recruiting of a Bavarian corps to be equipped and paid by the Greek state. Externally and internally, Greece became in effect a Bavarian protectorate.

It was hoped that the regency would convoke a national assembly from which it could receive a mandate to govern. The Regents did not do so, however, and, in his first royal proclamation, Otho himself rejected the principle that the sovereignty of the people is the source of royal authority by styling himself "Otho by the grace of God King of Greece." His government ignored local autonomies, checked the freedom of the press, and relied wholly on functionaries imported from Germany for all phases of administration. Otho's system of autocratic government by Bavarian bureaucrats was interrupted by a revolt in September 1843, and the constitution which was formulated in consequence in 1844 fixed certain limitations on the monarchy. But Otho circumvented the constitution by lavish use of appointive powers, by building up a party of kings' friends, by managed elections, and by extra-parliamentary ministries; he forfeited the good will of the British by failure to provide in his budget for servicing the

foreign debt. The uprising of 1862, which forced his abdication, was not a coup engineered by a small group of malcontents but a nationwide popular movement. The right of the Greeks thus to take matters into their own hands was recognized in Europe. Earl Russel, the British Foreign Minister of the time, addressed the British minister at Athens as follows: "During a long course of years the British Government endeavored to impress on King Otho the mistaken nature of the system of government which he pursued, and the necessity of adopting a system better calculated to conciliate the affection and confidence of his subjects and to promote the prosperity of Greece. The kingdom of Greece having, by the transactions of 1832, been acknowledged as an independent state, the people of Greece are entitled to exercise the rights of national independence; and one of the rights which belong to an independent nation is that of changing its governing dynasty upon good and sufficient cause. Her Majesty's Government cannot deny that the Greeks have good and sufficient cause for the steps they have taken."

On the question of designating a successor to the Greek throne British and Russian interests were in conflict. The Russians had an apparently ideal candidate in the Duke of Leuchtenberg, whose father and title were Bavarian while his mother was the daughter of a Czar, his faith Orthodox, and his sympathies Russian. But efforts to secure the succession for the Bavarian house failed, the British invoking the previous agreement that no connections of the reigning houses of the protecting powers should accept the Greek throne. Thus though a Greek plebiscite overwhelmingly voted for Prince Alfred, second son of Queen Victoria, despite reminders of

of his ineligibility, that prince declined the invitation. The vote indicated Greece's faith in and reliance upon England, and it was to England that Greece looked for other suggestions. But it was only guidance and suggestion the Greeks sought: they gave the protecting powers no plenary mandate to select a king for them. Otho had been chosen by the protecting powers and had immediately transferred the sovereignty of the nation to himself; this time the procedure was to be different.

The choice fell upon the seventeen-year old Prince William George (Gluecksberg), second son of Prince, afterwards King, Christian of Denmark. The recent marriage of his sister, Princess Alexandra, to the Prince of Wales, constituted a close tie with Great Britain, and his own subsequent marriage to the Grand Duchess Olga of Russia, daughter of the Grandduke Constantine, was a bond with another of the protective powers. Britain facilitated the acceptance, and indicated its good will by announcing the transfer to the Greeks of the Ionian Islands, which had been a British protectorate since 1815. The new king was duly elected by a national assembly after it had been reassured concerning his political tendencies, and he was pointedly designated "constitutional King of the Hellenes." He was to be styled George I, and it was stipulated that his heirs must profess the Orthodox faith. Unlike the treaty of 7 May 1832, which was negotiated without consultation with the Greek people, the treaty of 13 July 1863 by which Denmark and the protecting powers established the dynastic regime adhered to the conditions laid down by the National Assembly and recognized Greece as a constitutional state.

George's title, 'King of the Hellenes,' embodied the aspiration of the Greeks for the incorporation into Greece of areas as yet "unredeemed" from Turkey, and efforts to realize this goal dominate subsequent Greek history. In 1897 Greek incursions in Macedonia and Epirus brought on open war with Turkey. Crown Prince Constantine's army fled from Larissa in disgraceful rout, and the event left him under a cloud of unpopularity. His wife, the future Queen Sophia, was a sister of William II of Germany, and the fact that William's officers had trained the victorious Turkish army, and had actually participated in the fighting did not add to the Prince's popularity. Greece was rescued by the intervention of the powers, but George had come very near losing his throne. The King's second son, Prince George, played a part in Cretan affairs. At the end of 1898 the last Turkish soldiers left Crete, and a national government was formed for the island (though Turkish suzerainty was still acknowledged) with Prince George as High Commissioner. The Prince's absolutist tendencies called forth the resolute resistance of Eleftherios Venizelos. In 1905-6 disorders occasioned the intervention of the powers, and Prince George was forced to resign.

King George I was enlightened as compared with his predecessor. Administration was now actually in the hands of Greeks, but the monarchy always lagged some paces behind Greek liberal thought, and the dynasty was not popular. Discontent was crystallized in 1909 in an anti-dynastic and potentially republican movement. The moment appeared favorable for putting an end to the monarchy and establishing a republic; and the republican leader Venizelos might have been expected

to use his great prestige to promote such a consummation. But Venizelos was apparently convinced of the worth of constitutional monarchy, and George was sufficiently astute to invite him (18 October 1910) to head a government. The King had previously consented to the removal of Crown Prince Constantine from his post as commander in chief, and of his other sons from other posts in the army and navy. Popular discontent was channeled and absorbed in the 1911 revision of the constitution, and the monarchy emerged from the crisis with renewed strength.

George I was assassinated at Saloniki, which had just been added to the Greek kingdom as a result of the Balkan War, on 18 March 1913, and was succeeded by his son, Constantine I. Constantine's political and constitutional differences with the Venizelists were occasioned by the international situation and by the question of Greek participation in the World War. Greek sentiment was predominantly on the side of the Allies, who had been mainly responsible for Greek independence, but Constantine was very strongly influenced by his brother-in-law, the Kaiser, and by his German advisers. In 1915 Venizelos' proposal to assist in the Allied attack on the Dardanelles was approved by the Chamber and by the Royal Council; but Constantine rejected the proposal, dismissed Venizelos, and dissolved the Chamber. Venizelos returned to office, but was again dismissed and the Chamber again dissolved, when Bulgaria was on the point of attacking Serbia and Venizelos wanted Greece to observe its tready obligations by coming to Serbia's aid.

In May 1916, by an agreement secretly made between Greece, Germany, and Bulgaria, Constantine handed over to

the Bulgars Fort Rupel on the northern frontier, and two months later a whole Greek division was instructed to surrender to the Germans and Bulgars at Kavalla. Greek patriots were confounded, and in August 1916, immediately after Rumania joined the Allies, Venizelos established a provisional government at Saloniki, which was held by an Allied force. The Allies gave partial recognition to both governments, and did not demand Constantine's abdication until June 1917. Throughout, Constantine's sympathies had been German, even at a manifest disadvantage to the national interest and despite the express desire of his people. When, upon Bulgaria's mobilization, his ministers proposed to the King that Greece should also mobilize Constantine refused. When told that it was his duty as a constitutional monarch to follow his ministers' policy, approved by the country at the recent elections, he said: "I recognize my obligation to obey the popular verdict whenever it is a question of internal questions, but when it is a question of external questions, I must insist that my idea be followed, for I am responsible before God." In November 1916 the Allies demanded control of certain military installations in Greece, and it was arranged that a small force, unprepared for such an eventuality, was attacked by the royalists, and many were killed. The Queen telegraphed to her brother the Kaiser that there had been "a great victory over four Great Powers, whose troops fled before the Greeks and later retired under the escort of Greek troops," and added: "May the infamous swine receive the punishment which they deserve!" For half a year the indignant Allies continued to temporize. In June M. Jonnart was sent to Athens as High Commissioner of the protecting powers to demand Constantine's abdication in favor of one of his sons. The Germanophile

Crown Prince, George, the present King, was ruled out. On 12 June 1917, the King agreed to leave the country with the Crown Prince, and appointed his second son Alexander his successor. He did not officially abdicate, doubtless in the expectation that in the event of a German victory, for which he still hoped, he would return to Athens in triumph.

Alexander was twenty-four when he ascended the throne. He held a commission as captain of artillery, and little was known of him outside court and military circles. He created an unfavorable impression at first by declaring his determination to "follow the lines of his father's brilliant reign"; but in a letter addressed to his prime minister a few days later he declared his intention to observe the constitution faithfully and said that he was persuaded of the Allies' benevolent intentions. Despite Venizelos' brilliant successes in gaining concessions for Greece at the peace conferences, there was a reaction against the Venizelists, and when, on 25 October 1920, King Alexander died, as a result of the bite of a pet monkey, elections were fought on the personal question; Constantine or Venizelos. In the 15 November elections Venizelos was defeated. Rallis became premier, made the Queen Mother Olga regent for Alexander's younger brother, Prince Paul, and instituted a plebiscite for the recall of Constantine, who returned to Athens 20 December 1920.

Greek aspirations in Asia Minor resulted in a campaign against the Turks in 1921. Prince Andrew, younger brother of Constantine, was in command of a division and King Constantine himself was present in Smyrna, though not in command. The campaign was an utter failure, and in September 1922 the Turks sacked Smyrna. A large body of officers, headed by Colonel

Plastiras, took refuge in the island of Chios and collected a considerable body of men. They sent airplanes over Athens to drop copies of a proclamation demanding the abdication of Constantine in favor of the Crown Prince under threat of marching on Athens with an army of 15,000 men. The King this time abdicated, and again left Greece; he died in Palermo in January 1923. British admonitions failed to save the six ministers and generals who were court-martialled for responsibility for the defeat, but the former British naval attache succeeded in saving Prince Andrew, who was to have been tried on the charge of disobeying orders while in command of the right wing of the army in Asia Minor.

George II, whose wife Elizabeth was the daughter of King Ferdinand of Rumania, ascended the throne 28 September 1922, but the government was in the hands of revolutionary appointees. During 1923 the need for reestablishing a constitutional regime became obvious. An attempted royalist counter-revolution led by General Metaxas only succeeded in strengthening republican sentiment. King George consented to a request that he leave Greece for a period of three months to leave the country's choice of its future government unhampered. On 25 March 1924 a Republic was proclaimed by a resolution of the assembly, and Admiral Koundouriotis, the regent, became president. In the plebiscite held the following month more than two-thirds of the votes were cast in favor of the republic. All the members of the royal family were deprived of their nationality, and their property in Greece was confiscated. The republic was recognized by the foreign powers.

In January 1926 General Pangalos made himself dictator and held power until August, when he was removed by a coup

of General Kondylis. Differences between royalists and liberals threatening the equilibrium of the state brought Venizelos back as prime minister (3 July 1928), in which office he continued until a coalition government took over in 1932. In March 1933 an attempted coup by General Plastiras failed, as did an attempted revolution in March 1935, in which Venizelos was involved. Very severe sentences were passed on those implicated, and the question of the restoration of the monarchy was raised. In October, a vote in favor of proclaiming Greece a monarchical state was obtained from the national assembly, but on the understanding that the king should not return before a plebiscite. In the plebiscite held 3 November 1935 107 percent of the electorate was reported to have voted for the restoration, and even the "corrected" figures gave the total of 97 percent.

King George was received in Athens on 25 November 1935. He had occupied the Greek throne from 28 September 1922 to 19 December 1923. Since his departure from Greece ha had lived in London, and had become a well known figure in English society. He was now forty-five years old. George embarked on a policy of political appeasement by granting an amnesty to all political offenders, which, however, was opposed by the regent. In 1936 George appointed General Metaxas to the premiership. Labor was restless and threatened a general strike for 5 August 1936. On 4 August 1936 Metaxas obtained the king's signature to decrees proclaiming martial law, suspending articles of the constitution which affected personal liberty, and dissolving the chamber.

Metaxas' regime followed the familiar fascist pattern, including persecution of dissidents by political police under the dreaded Maniadakis. In the critical months preceding and following the outbreak of hostilities, centralized authority at least had the advantage of expediting the formulation and execution of decisions; and even the opposition refrained from criticism. On 28 October 1940 Italy invaded Greece. At the end of January 1941 Metaxas died, and was succeeded by Korizis. In April the war minister treasonably ordered a four months leave for the army, and between the 17th and 19th Korizis committed suicide, and the King assumed the premiership, with the pro-German Kotzias as vice-premier. On the 20th Tsolakoglou signed an armistice with the Germans at Larissa.

The King's advisers urged him to go to the front, do his duty to Greece, and even in his death insure his immortal fame and the perpetuation of his dynasty. But on 21 April he appointed Tsouderos prime minister, and himself retired from the cabinet; and on the 23rd when the second armistice was signed, went to Crete. Reports that the King participated in the defense of Crete seem to be without foundation; in any case he flew to Cairo on the 25th. Subsequently he made an extensive tour to seek assistance for his country. He and his government arrived from London in Cairo on 15 March 1943. However successful he may have been in conciliating British and American public and official opinion, opposition in the ranks of his own countrymen was on the increase. Greek liberals of all shades disliked the repressive Metaxas regime, and identified the King with that regime because he had acquiesced in it, in violation of his oath to remain a constitutional monarch. Many patriots who had approved of

the Metaxas regime were alienated by what they regarded as recklessness or worse on the part of the King during the weeks preceding and following the fall of Greece. These dissatisfactions crystallized into a conviction, almost universal within Greece and very widely held without, that the king must not return until the country was reoccupied, a provisional government established, and a plebiscite on the question of the king's return held. The king acceded to popular demands by ejecting from the cabinet "reactionaries" like Admiral Sakkelariou and Kannelopoulos and drawing in the more liberal Sophocles Venizelos as minister of marine and George Roussos as Vice-Premier.

On 4 July 1943 the King delivered an address on the radio in which he declared that free and general elections for a constituent assembly would be held as soon as the security of the country should be complete and the necessity of military operations allowed. The implication appeared to be that the king intended to return with the liberating army, and that the elections would be postponed. The oppostion feared that such postponement would mean that the election would then be held under the constraints of a provisional and dictatorial government, and with the implied threat that relief and rehabilitation would be withheld unless the results of the plebiscite suited the desires of those in power. This fear led those in Greece to send emissaries to Cairo.

On 13-14 August Exindaris and four representatives of the EAM popular resistance group in Greece conferred with the government in exile and the British in Cairo, and urged that the return of the king to Greece be postponed until after the plebiscite in order to avoid civil war. On the

seventeenth, representatives of EAM and of the other guerrilla groups, EDES and EKKA, signed a joint declaration against the king's return before a plebiscite. Exindaris, as authorized spokesman for the democratic parties of Greece and for all the principal political parties inside Greece, urged Tsouderos and his cabinet to make a statement to the effect that the King would not return to Greece before the Greeks should have an opportunity to choose the form of government they desire. Thus Greek opinion had been virtually unanimously expressed.

Prime Minister Churchill, in a speech on 31 August, quoted with approval the king's broadcast of 4 July, and added: "Until the Greek people can express their will in conditions of freedom and tranquillity, it is the settled policy of His Majesty's Government to support the King of the Hellenes, who is at once our loyal ally and the constitutional head of the Greek state." Pressure for a statement by the king increased, and at the end of November he declared in a letter to Prime Minister Tsouderos that at the proper moment he would, in consultation with his government, consider carefully the question of his return to Greece and that he would base his decision on the political and military situation at that time. The Cabinet was said to be pleased with this pronouncement, but four republican members expressed the conviction that the king should at once give his promise not to return before elections. In January 1944 Vice-Premier George Roussos resigned. Roussos had steadily opposed the return of King George before a plebiscite. It now (April 1944) seems clear that the British have decided that the king shall not return to Greece until a plebiscite has been held.

An incident of the middle of February illustrates the present attitude of the Greek Navy to the royal family. Officers of the Navy had rejected Prince Paul's request to board ships of the Navy on the grounds that his presence would discommode the personnel. The King then backed the Prince's demand that he be allowed on board, but the refusal of the officers was firmly maintained by the admirals of the fleet. Prince Paul did not succeed in boarding any ship.

II. BULGARIA

By article I of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Bulgaria was constituted a Principality, autonomous and tributary under the sovereignty of the Sultan. On 10 February 1879, an Assembly of Notables met at Tirnovo, and on 16 April voted a constitution inspired by liberal principles. The constitution created a single house, named the National Assembly (Narodno Sobranie) and elected by direct and universal suffrage. The legislative power was to be held jointly by the Prince and this single house. The right to revise the constitution and to elect a king in the event of a vacancy was given to a Grand National Assembly (Velice Narodno Sobranie), elected like the ordinary assembly but composed of twice the number of members. The constitution provided for the separation of powers, the responsibilities of Ministers, and the rights and duties of the citizens. In this way it clearly delimited the functions of the sovereign, and in general embodied the fundamental principles of a progressive parliamentary regime. Although frequently ignored, this constitution underwent no important change until the coup d'etat of 10 May 1934, when it was suspended.

Prior to the adoption of the constitution there had been no popular opposition to monarchy as such; but previous controversy on the form of the monarchy -- whether it should be constitutional or autocratic -- had been prolonged and heated, and had given rise to Bulgaria's first two political parties, the Liberal and the Conservative. The Liberals stood for parliamentary supremacy and a constitutional monarchy of the British type, while the Conservatives favored a strong executive (the Monarch) and a bi-cameral parliament with a powerful

partially appointed Senate. The decisive victory of the Liberals in the Constitutional Assembly and during the subsequent three general elections left no doubt about the attitude of the people on this issue. Ottoman misrule and oppression had not only created a deep-rooted desire for the largest possible measure of individual freedom but it had leveled off Bulgarian society. Vestiges of the medieval court, and of the feudal and ecclesiastical nobility had long since disappeared. In 1879, the Bulgarian population consisted almost entirely of small peasant proprietors most of whom were illiterate with little experience in local self-government. A small merchant and intellectual class was just emerging. From the ranks of these two classes were recruited most of the Bulgarian leaders. Many of the prominent political leaders during and after 1879 had received some schooling in political matters during the struggle for Bulgarian church independence from the Greek Patriarch and from the Phanariet clergy, which ended in 1870 with the granting to the Bulgarian population of an independent Bulgarian church. This experience, however, and the meagre political education afforded by a certain degree of local, guild self-government under Ottoman supervision, were not sufficient to give to the Bulgarian people in 1879 maturity of judgment and political stability. Many Bulgarians were aware of this handicap and saw in the person of the monarch a kind of a supreme arbiter and stabilizer of political life. Political inexperience, therefore, is one of the main factors influencing the first years of Bulgarian statehood.

Moreover, even under the most favorable internal conditions Bulgaria would have been a difficult country to govern.

In Bulgaria the interests and intrigues of the great European Powers clashed and for many years added to the unsettled internal conditions of the country. In the first days of its statehood Bulgaria became the focal point of the centuries-old Eastern Question. The peace of San-Stefano of 3 March 1878, by which Russia forced the Turks to liberate the Bulgarians, alarmed the Powers, especially Britain, at the extension of Russian influence to the Mediterranean. They called the Congress of Berlin, which dismembered the Bulgaria of San-Stefano, and divided the country into three main parts: the region between the Danube and the Balkan mountains, made an autonomous principality, with Sofia as its capital; the region south of the Balkan mountains, made a privileged province called "Eastern Rumelia", and remaining under the political and military authority of the Sultan; and the region between Eastern Rumelia, the Principality of Bulgaria, present Albania, and the Aegean Sea, -- Macedonia -- which remained a Turkish province. This division greatly disappointed Bulgarian patriots, and the hope of uniting these three territories into the Bulgaria planned at San Stefano has dominated Bulgarian foreign policy ever since.

These intial disadvantages might possibly have been overcome if Bulgaria's first monarch had been a man of experience, with a thorough knowledge of Bulgaria and its people and a devotion to liberal-democratic principles. Prince Alexander of Battenberg, however, whom the National Assembly elected in April 1879 to the Bulgarian throne, did not possess these qualities. German by origin and a nephew by marriage of Tsar Alexander II, whose candidate he was, the young Prince first ruled as an autocrat and as a Russian puppet. He suspended

the constitution and appointed Russians to high office. In 1883, however, under pressure of public opinion, he bagan to pursue a more independent and popular course. He restored the constitution, and yielded power to a coalition government. In September 1885, he somewhat hesitantly approved the annexation of Eastern Rumelia without consulting Russia. This action alienated the Russians, and led directly to his dramatic kidnapping by pro-Russian officers of the Bulgarian army. The Bulgarian people, led by Stambulov, desired his return, especially because of his victory over the Serbs in 1886, but on a formal order from Tsar Alexander III, he was forced to abdicate in September 1886.

The Great National Assembly first elected as Alexander's successor Prince Valdemar of Denmark, who did not accept. After an interregnum, marked by Russian and Austrian intrigues, it then chose on 7 July 1887 Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a young lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian army.

Grandson of Louis-Phillipe of France, Ferdinand of Coburg was intelligent and ambitious, a shrewd diplomat who knew how to take advantage of his relationship with the monarchs of Europe. Until the end of 1912, his reign, at least as regards foreign policy, was highly successful; thereafter it was disastrous. Unfortunately, he was always the aristocrat in his manners and his feelings, proud of his ancestry and deeply attached to the principles and forms of monarchy. He never understood the essentially democratic peasant people over whom he was called upon to reign, and in turn was never understood by them. There was never any sincere cooperation between the sovereign and the Bulgarian political leaders. The latter, in Ferdinand's mind, were no more than puppets, to be used

and discarded according to his policies of the moment.

During the first seven years of Ferdinand's reign, Russia remained openly hostile and succeeded in preventing international recognition of the new prince. Bulgaria's political independence was largely maintained through the efforts of Stefan Stambulov, president of the council until 1894. It was not until after the death of Tsar Alexander III and the fall of Stambulov's anti-Russian cabinet that a reconciliation with Russia was achieved. The heir to the Bulgarian throne, Prince Boris (born 30 January 1894) was received into the Orthodox church, and in 1896, Ferdinand was finally recognized as Prince of Bulgaria and Governor of Eastern Rumelia. Stambulov's fall from power also marked the beginning of Ferdinand's "personal regime." From 1896 until the end of his reign he dominated his cabinets, acted as his own foreign minister, and complied with the constitution only when it suited him to do so.

Ferdinand's foreign policy was centered upon the realization of the Greater Bulgaria envisaged by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. Relations between Bulgaria and Turkey had deteriorated considerably. The unrest of the Macedonian Christian population, the inability of the great powers to make effective arrangements for the betterment of the lot of the Macedonians, the corruption and cruelty of the Turkish authorities, the activities of the IMRO and a steady stream of Macedonian refugees into Bulgaria imposing considerable financial strain on the country had all combined to produce a dangerous situation.

Fear of a Turkish attack compelled Ferdinand to seek the support of a great power. The Russian-Bulgarian rapprochement which began in 1896 was resented by Austria-Hungary, but

Ferdinand remained unmoved, and even concluded a secret military convention with Russia in 1902. The danger of an open conflict between Russia and Austria continued for several years. Early in 1908 Ferdinand went to Vienna to seek Austrian support. He was received well but concluded no alliance. After the Young Turk Revolution in July 1908 Ferdinand reached an agreement with Emperor Francis Joseph, the results of which soon became apparent. On 6 October Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The preceding day Ferdinand proclaimed Bulgaria, including Eastern Rumelia, an independent kingdom and himself Tsar of the Bulgarian people. In April 1909 the independence of Bulgaria was recognized by the Powers.

The Young Turk revolution of 1908 also provided Ferdinand with the opportunity to initiate the negotiations which were later to culminate in the Balkan League. Serbia and Greece, also threatened by Turkish expansion, were gradually persuaded by the Russians and by Ferdinand to exchange their traditional rivalries for an alliance, with each other and with Bulgaria. The disposition of territory to be gained by war against the Turks was agreed upon in advance, and in October 1912, the allies declared war, and proceeded to win instant successes over the Turks. Because the powers, catering to Austria's desire not to let Serbia reach the Adriatic, then created an independent Albania out of territory scheduled to be annexed by the Serbians, Serbia wished to reconsider the preliminary agreement with Bulgaria over Macedonia.

On 29 June 1913 the Bulgarian army attacked its former allies, Serbia and Greece. The order of attack was given without the knowledge of the Bulgarian government, which on the following day recalled General Savov, and ordered the

hostilities stopped. General Savov immediately protested his innocence, and affirmed that he had merely executed the orders of King Ferdinand. The latter, having given no written order, let the entire responsibility fall upon his former protege. This maneuver, and the fact that Ferdinand still enjoyed great prestige with the right wing policial parties, saved him and his dynasty from being too closely linked with the complete military defeat which ensued. Nevertheless, a powerful reaction from the people was unavoidable. The treaty of Bucharest which Ferdinand was forced to conclude on 11 August 1913 left Bulgaria with very little of the desired gains. The political parties of the opposition demanded that the members of Ferdinand's government be tried before a Government Court, and the personal rule of the king was strongly but vainly criticized.

The danger faced by the Bulgarian dynasty after the Second Balkan War and the frame of mind of the country early in the First World War were clearly illustrated in the famous meeting which took place on 17 September 1915 between King Ferdinand and the leaders of the opposition. In protest against the King's manifest intention of aligning Bulgaria with the Central Powers, the opposition leaders emphasized Bulgaria's gratitude to Russia, the "terrible impression of the last national disaster," and the people's distrust of the King and his government. Stamboliski, leader of the Agrarian party, reminded Ferdinand of the popular desire for action against "those responsible for the disaster" of the Second Balkan War, and warned that the opposition leaders would not again intercede in his behalf. In the eyes of the opposition, action against Russia in favor of the Central Powers would be considered a "premeditated crime."

Bulgaria's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers was undoubtedly instigated by Ferdinand. Despite his people's sympathies with Russia and the opposition's efforts to dissuade him, he found the cause of the Central Powers best suited to Bulgaria's interests, as he understood them, and to his own personal sympathies. It is believed that concrete territorial promises by the Allies might have won Ferdinand over, but the offers of the Central Powers were far less vague and much more attractive to him. On 11 October 1915, Bulgaria declared war. The most prominent members of the Agrarian party, including Stamboliski, were imprisoned. Radoslavov, the Premier, was a mediocre man, ignorant of foreign questions, who headed the government merely because the King appreciated his docility and mediocrity.

Never enthusiastic about the war, the Bulgarians wanted peace as early as December 1916. The government did its best to refrain from an offensive against the Russians in the hope of preserving its "moral ties" with that country. In July 1917, when preparations for a new offensive on the Salonika Front became a matter of public knowledge, the leaders of the opposition demanded the convocation of parliament, and condemned Ferdinand's regime for leading the country toward a new catastrophe. By June 1918, feeling had risen so high that Ferdinand was obliged to dismiss Radoslavov and to ask Alexander Malinov, leader of the Democratic Party, to constitute a new cabinet. The new government, although greeted with enthusiasm by the great majority of the people, lacked courage and ability in dealing with foreign affairs. Still dominated by Ferdinand, it clung to the German alliance until September 1918, when defeat on the Salonik a front and a

collapse in the morale of the Bulgarian army, who disliked the Germans and who had been much impressed by Allied propaganda stressing Wilson's fourteen points, forced it to request an armistice. Faced with internal revolution, Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his oldest son, Prince Boris, and left Bulgaria on 3 October 1918. Sensing the extreme insecurity in which he had left the dynasty, he is said to have urged Boris to leave the country with him.

Ferdinand's reign is considerably easier to evaluate than that of Alexander of Battenberg. The position of the Bulgarian throne was much more secure when Ferdinand came to Bulgaria in 1887 than when he left the country in 1918. Whatever contribution he may have made to Bulgaria's internal development and to her international prestige was far outweighed by the two disastrous wars into which he led the country within a period of two years. He all but destroyed the dynasty. He left his son and heir a starving country, an outraged people, and the shakiest of thrones. Indeed it is astonishing that the peasant Stamboliski, now released from prison where Ferdinand had put him, who dreamt of a Balkan Federation and of a world-wide "Green International", should not, when he returned to power, have rid himself and the country of the dynasty. Stamboliski was a man who gave away at times to intense wrath. He could have removed the 25-year old Boris with ease.

During the years of Stamboliski's premiership (October 1919 - June 1923) Boris remained in the background. The plight of the defeated and impoverished country was often aggravated by Stamboliski's excesses and by his exaggerated peasant dislike of the city population. However, for several years neither the king nor any other force in the country was in a position

to oppose him, and the peasant premier boasted with some justice that he "held the little Tsar in the palm of his hand." Such a statement, however, does not give a true picture of Stamboliski's attitude toward Boris. There must have been some quality in the young king, which appealed to the premier, who is said to have cherished strong paternal feelings toward him. Even Boris' severest critics do not seriously accuse him of complicity in the coup d'etat, led by the reactionary Tsankov, which overthrew and murdered Stamboliski in June 1923, although the King may have been aware of the plot.

The position of Boris in the political life of the country during Tsankov's regime (June 1923 - January 1926) is still somewhat obscure. It seems fairly certain however that toward the end of 1925 his influence increased and that he was instumental in elevating Liapchev to the premiership in place of Tsankov (January 1926). After Tsankov's stormy and often bloody days, many saw in the change of cabinets a return to more normal conditions. Toward the end of Liapchev's administration, Boris married Princess Giovanna (Ioanna), daughter of King Victor Emmanuel of Italy (Oct. 1930). The union between the two courts was also symbolic of closer Italian-Bulgarian relations.

The world-wide depression brought economic unrest, and the period 1931-34 witnessed repeated cabinet crises and shifts in power, contrasting sharply with the dictatorial regimes of Stamboliski and Tsankov. Left wing elements which had been ruthlessly suppressed began to organize legally under new forms. They made a strong showing in elections in the early 1930's. In May 1934 Bulgaria experienced its second coup d'etat within ten years, -- the bloodless "Zveno" coup. A political club

with high army connections, the Zvenari combined a program of authoritarian measures at home with a strongly internationalist and pro-Russian foreign policy. The Tirnovo Constitution was suspended by decree, the IMRO was disbanded, and Ivan Mihailov, its leader, fled to Turkey. All political parties were outlawed, strict censorship of the press was introduced, and an authoritarian regime was established. Zveno wanted friendly relations with Yugoslavia, and believed that the solution of the problem of Macedonia lay in the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia within a larger federation. It was generally believed at the time that Zveno had republican sympathies. However this may have been, it was clear that the coup d'etat had been forced upon Boris, and that he had been pushed aside as far as public affairs were concerned. Differences and dissensions between Zveno and the Military League (through whose control of the army it had come to power) led to the resignation of the Zveno government in January 1935.

Thereafter Boris asserted himself more resolutely than before, and became for the remainder of his reign the dominant political personality in Bulgaria. The Premiers -- General Zlatev (January - September 1935), Andrei Toshev (September - November 1935), George Kiosseivanov (November 1935 - February 1940), and Bogdan Filov (February 1940 - September 1943) -- were his personal appointees. In December 1933 Boris paid an official visit to King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, which was intended as a contribution to friendlier relations. Alexander returned the visit ten months later, but this effort toward improved relations was terminated a week later when Alexander was assassinated. In the meantime the coming of Hitler to power in Germany had begun to be felt in the Balkans.

Boris realized that Bulgaria wasbecoming economically dependent on Germany, but efforts to induce Britain and France to trade with Bulgaria were unsuccessful. In 1933 only about 25 percent of Bulgarian trade was with Germany. By 1938 about 70 percent of Bulgarian exports went to Germany, and this increased to about 80 - 90 percent after the outbreak of the war.

Hitler's career of political conquest through the fall of France in the spring of 1940 and the defeat of the British at Dunkerque made him seem invincible. At the end of 1940 he appeared ready to embark upon a Balkan campaign. On 17 November 1940 he summoned Boris to Berchtesgarden, and it is clear that Boris agreed at this meeting to sign the Tri-partite pact. The Prime Minister attempted to conceal the purpose of the meeting, but when the newsreached Sofia, Nikola Mushanov, leader of the opposition in the Sobranie, attacked Boris for not letting the people choose "between war and neutrality." Russia and Britain made a last-minute effort to keep Bulgaria neutral. But neither of them could match Hitler's offers of territorial inducements. After 18 months of precarious neutrality, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov signed the Axis Pact in Vienna 1 March 1941. A few hours later German motorized units poised across the Danube began to roll into Bulgaria. In return for free passage thru Bulgaria on his way to attack Greece and Yugoslavia, Hitler gave Boris Macedonia and Western Thrace, taking them from the Greeks and Yugoslavs, who chose to resist the Germans. These areas were later formally "annexed" to Bulgaria, and Bulgarian troops were sent into adjacent Yugoslav and Greek territory to perform police duties for the Germans. Boris and the Bulgarian government hoped to

stay out of the "shooting" war, and made many concessions to the Germans. Traditional pro-Russian feeling has put out of the question a declaration of war on the USSR. Boris' death came on 28 August 1943, unexpectedly and under somewhat mysterious circumstances. He had just returned to Sofia from a meeting with Hitler which is said to have been unpleasant and stormy. One of the most persistent rumors is that he was removed by Hitler because he was contemplating the abandonment of Bulgaria's alliance with Germany. It is difficult to see how he could have managed this.

Of the three modern Bulgarian kings, Boris was certainly the most popular. He spent all of his life in Bulgaria and knew the people better than either his father, King Ferdinand, or Prince Alexander of Battenberg. His personal courage, intelligence, and modesty endeared him to many Bulgarians. Partly because of the mysterious circumstances of his death, partly because he acquired Macedonia and Thrace while keeping Bulgaria from actively engaging in the war, he has become to many Bulgarians something of a martyr and a hero. The present regime eulogizes him as the Tsar-Unifier, and uses him in all its efforts to keep in line the population, increasingly restive under Allied air attack.

Even though the Bulgarian people are now aware that the Germans have lost the war, Boris' reputation has not suffered appreciably. His brother, Prince Kiril, now chief regent, was once regarded as a nonentity, but is now reported demonstrating certain qualities of character. Kiril is said to be "pro-Allied," and to be seeking to find a way out which would preserve the dynasty and the social order in Bulgaria. The Queen Mother has been reported to be anti-German ever since the

collapse of the Mussolini regime. Prince Simeon, heir to the throne, is of course too young to have political opinions. Whether or not the dynasty will continue in Bulgaria appears to depend in part on whether or not the rest of the Balkan countries are monarchies or republics. The dynasty as such is probably not discredited, but the strength of the Partisan movement, which is as yet unassessed, but is almost surely anti-dynastic, may be found before the war is over to have had a considerable effect on public opinion.

III. RUMANIA

Carol II of Rumania has been in exile since 1940, while the fourth king of the dynasty, his 22-year old son Michael, "reigns", as a direct result of German domination of the kingdom. So far as the Rumanian public is concerned, Carol lost favor during the critical period beginning in the final days of 1937; nevertheless, his abdication was forced not so much by public opinion but by Marshal Ion Antonescu acting for the Germans at the head of an Iron Guard government. The fact that Carol's opposition to the Iron Guard and to the Hitler government cost him his throne, remains as a talking point so long as the royal exile and his supporters entertain hope for his return. In the meantime the royal house is represented inside Rumania by a young and restive figure-head, accompanied by the Queen Mother Helen, whom Carol deserted 20 years ago. Michael is devoted to his father and would probably be happy to abdicate in his favor; both father and son look to the British and Americans to liberate the country from German domination.

Having nullified the royal power, which amounted to a dictatorship between the end of December 1937 and the early days of September 1940, Antonescu and his German patrons have thus far found it expedient to retain Michael and his mother as symbols of Rumania's illusory independence. Considering the personal distaste of the royal house for the Germans, however, it would seem that the day is nearing when the regime may find it best to take Michael out of the country to prevent him from capitulating to the United Nations. The case of Victor Emmanuel is undoubtedly uppermost in the minds of the Germans and their Rumanian collaborators. Once the Germans

are expelled from the kingdom, while the King is held prisoner by them, the problem of filling the throne may become rather acute. This, nevertheless, does not imply that postwar Rumania will be unable to govern itself without a king. However, inasmuch as no republican movement is developing, the monarchy is expected to survive as an institution, even if the throne becomes temporarily vacant.

In 1859 the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia united by electing the same man as their prince, Col. Alexander Cuza, then an obscure soldier. The land owning aristocracy, by whom these states were controlled, had no intention, however, of allowing Cuza to reign indefinitely. It was generally felt that, once unity was achieved and the protests of the Turkish suzerain were weathered, the united principalities would enjoy a more stable existence and greater international prestige if their prince were a foreigner of royal blood. The opponents of Cuza grew bolder until they forced him to abdicate in 1866, and then set out to find a more suitable incumbent for the throne at Bucharest.

Prince Karl, who was selected by the heads of the state, was a scion of the South German and Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Twenty-seven years of age and a cavalry captain, the founder of the present Rumanian dynasty was the second son of Karl Anton, who a dozen years before had voluntarily renounced his position as prince of a Russian province, thereafter serving as Premier until succeeded by Bismarck in 1861. The offer of the Rumanian throne came to the young Prussian officer while he was on furlough at Duesseldorf, where his father had his headquarters as military governor of the Rhineland-Westphalia district. Throughout his reign Karl,

remembered in Rumania as Carol I, strove to align his adopted country with Germany. While shrewd enough to refrain from attempting to Germanize the backward culture of his subjects, he remained a Prussian and a soldier to the end.

For the first 12 years of this reign the Rumanians remained a vassal people under the suzerainty of Turkey. The Sultan was persuaded to approve the election of a Hohenzollern, later confirmed by a plebiscite with very few dissenting votes, on condition that the army, then numbering only 17,648, should not exceed 30,000. Determined to achieve independence, Carol devoted considerable attention to this virtually useless body of troops so that by the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war (1877) the Rumanians boasted a force of 50,000 men, in relatively good shape and comprising artillery units equipped with 180 guns. The outbreak of hostilities gave the principality, as the Tsar's ally, the opportunity to declare itself independent. One year later Rumania became a kingdom, and in 1881 Carol, at his zenith as a popular military hero, received a crown fashioned from the metal of a Turkish cannon captured at Plevna (Bulgaria), where he had personally commanded the combined Russian and Rumanian forces. The anniversary of the coronation, 10 May, has since been celebrated as Rumania's Independence Day and the successive kings have worn the symbolic crown bequeathed by Carol I.

As monarch of an independent kingdom, Carol, pursuing his policy of supporting Germany against the Franco-Russian alliance (1891-4), quietly disregarded the wishes and constitutional function of the Rumanian cabinet and Parliament. In 1883, at the instance of Bismarck, the King bound himself by a treaty with the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary

and Italy), which he kept a closely guarded secret until 1914. When the World War broke out, he summoned the highest political figures of his country to a council held at his palace in Sinaia (3 August 1914). Revealing his 30-year-old secret treaty, the King argued against maintaining neutrality and against an alliance with Russia, which was tempting Rumania with the attractive prospect of annexing three provinces with a large Rumanian population, after the putative defeat of Austria-Hungary. Carol's arguments were of no avail, for the men he had summoned promptly placed him on the defensive by pointing out that his treaty had never been submitted to the legislature for ratification, that he did not dare to submit it, and that it was consequently no justification for declaring war on the Allied Powers. Deeply pained by this defeat, the aging King did not yield without a final gesture revealing his indomitable Prussian spirit. Although Carol might have realized that the officers of his army, like the statemen at Sinaia, were for neutrality, he instituted a private and informal poll among them, only to learn that of a corps of 6,000 officers a negligible minority of 110 advocated war against Russia.

In internal affairs the King manifested an indifference to the condition of the peasantry. The system of making elections to order was initiated in 1869, while the inordinate control of the prefects (appointed officials of the divisions of the kingdom) over the elections became a permanent feature of public life during the term of Conservative Premier Lascar Catargiu (1871-76), whose function it was to keep the King's Liberal opponents at a safe distance. Even a distant and conservative observer like Bismarck criticized his ally in Bucharest for allying himself with the big landowners instead of

siding with the oppressed peasantry, whose need for land and whose mistreatment was driving them to armed rebellion. When the agrarian discontent finally crystallized in the country-wide rebellion of 1907, Carol brutally suppressed the uprising. Once order was restored, the government placidly ignored the necessity for breaking up the large estates and for concerning itself with the plight of the rural masses. As the correspondent of the London Times reported, the King viewed the disorders of 1907 through the spectacles of the narrow-minded type of professional military man. He was concerned almost solely with the disciplinary aspect of a crying social disgrace. This judgment is confirmed by Carol's own published memoirs, in which not a single line is devoted to the peasant question.

Notwithstanding the defects of Carol I's policies, which were evident to his contemporaries as well as to the later historian, it must be acknowledged that he was personally superior to the native and foreign princes who preceded him, as well as to his successors. In the minds of living Rumanians his greatness is secure. Whatever dignity the royal house has attained in Rumania derives essentially from the standards of court life set by the first king. Such achievements as the development of the army, liberation from Turkish suzerainty, and the elevation of the principality to the ranks of a kingdom have outlasted the memory of the saamy side of Carol's long and troubled reign. Together with the name of their first king, Rumanians cherish that of his queen, the cultured German princess Elizabeth, known by her pen-name Carmen Sylva. Author of popular literary compositions in Rumanian, as well as German and French, Rumania's first queen served her country in 1877-78

by nursing wounded soldiers and gained great popularity by carrying on a variety of charitable activities.

The succession to the throne was regulated by the Constitution adopted in 1878, which provided that, should the King die without issue, the throne would go to his oldest brother or one of his descendants. This provision was accepted by Carol's father and brothers in 1880, the older brother renouncing his right in favor of his two sons. Nine years later the King, still childless, designated his younger nephew Ferdinand as heir apparent. Taking up residence in Rumania the same year, Ferdinand by the time he came to the throne at the age of 49 had spent a quarter of a century in Bucharest.

A Prussian officer like his uncle, Ferdinand nevertheless considered that Rumania's chances for survival and enlargement were dependent on an Allied victory. In August 1916 he summoned a council of cabinet ministers and party leaders to announce his decision to enter the war on the side of Russia and the Western Powers. While Ferdinand acted as commander-in-chief during the hostilities, he did not distinguish himself as a military leader. When the kingdom was overrun by the German army and the Treaty of Bucharest signed by Premier Alexandru Marghiloman in 1918, Ferdinand absented himself in order not to affix his signature. In this way the King kept clear of all blame for a settlement which gave Dobrudja to Bulgaria, the Carpathian passes to Austria-Hungary, and a 90-year lease on the oil fields to Germany.

The tremendous strides made by Rumania in the decade following the World War were neither aided nor hampered by Ferdinand. The creation of a Greater Rumania, twice the size of the Old Kingdom, the great land reform of the early '20s,

and the adoption of the liberal constitution of 1923, owed nothing to the King. That is not to say, however, that Ferdinand was content to permit duly chosen men to guide the state. In the course of 13 years he dismissed his Prime Minister four times, a dictatorial gesture in each case. The ejection of the Germanophile Premier Marghiloman in 1918 may be viewed as justifiable, once the Armistice was signed, but the other three cases betrayed a partiality for the Liberal party,(a corrupt and unrepresentative group, actually illiberal in character), which did the King little credit. Alexander Vaida-Voevod was dismissed in 1921 (some years before he turned pro-fascist) by a wire to London, at a time when he was actually in the process of working out Greater Rumania's relations with the Western Powers. General Averescu was removed from the premiership in 1922 and again in 1927, in each case simply to make way for a Liberal cabinet. A year after Ferdinand's death the Liberals were overwhelmingly defeated by the Peasant party in the first relatively free election ever permitted in Rumania. In dismissing these premiers Ferdinnnd, to be sure, was not overstepping the bounds of legality, but he did not scruple to strain the spirit of the Constitution to a dangerous degree, and his prestige suffered perceptibly thereby. The disillusionment of the general public with the King's policy of entrusting the state to politicians who so flagrantly exploited their power, is reflected in the observation by a visiting journalist that "no cheers greet Ferdinand when his limousine appears on the streets of the capital.".

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precedent set by Carmen Sylva by nursing the wounded. In peacetime she strove to win the confidence of the more advanced countries to which the state was looking for loans. Her famous visit to the U. S. in 1926 was accompanied by all the ballyhoo that her publicity agents could whip up.

The brief reign of Ferdinand and Mary was marred chiefly by the behavior of the headstrong heir to the throne, the future Carol II. In 1918 this prince had contracted a morganatic marriage with Zizi Lambrino by whom he had a son. Through the pressure of the royal court this marriage was annulled and Carol seemed to acquiesce in the selection of Princess Helen of Greece, whom he married in 1921. The same year a son was born, but it was not long before Carol abandoned his Princess for Elena Lupescu, a member of the Bucharest fast set whose reputation made all persons concerned extremely uncomfortable about this liaison. The Liberal party oligarchy surrounding Ferdinand were determined to rid themselves of this embarrassment, particularly since Carol showed signs of slef-assertion in matters of state. As a result of this situation, when Carol left for London to attend a family funeral in November 1925, he did not return to Rumania. The following month, 28 December, a minister despatched by his father obtained his signature to a formal renunciation of the throne; on 4 January 1926 this act was accepted by Parliament, and Carol's infant son Michael proclaimed heir in his father's stead.

When Ferdinand died in 1927, a regency was set up, consisting of his second son Nicholas, who has avoided politics for the most part, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church. But Carol had by

no means resigned himself to a lifelong exile. Indeed, inasmuch as he periodically dropped hints regarding his return, Ferdinand in the last days of his life had requested Carol to make his denunciation definitive, to which the future king shrewdly replied that he would be unable to decline a call to serve his country. The desired opportunity arrived in 1930. Premier Iuliu Maniu, at the head of a Peasant party government, arranged for Carol's surprise return, believing that his establishment on the throne would lend stability to the state and would prevent the Liberals from returning to power and resuming their selfish and reactionary practices. Maniu optimistically believed that Carol would be content to reign as the constitutional monarch of a democratic country, and that his sense of responsibility would inhibit him from violating his promise to keep his mistress outside Rumania.

The irregular career of Prince Carol during the '20s bears little relation to the personal policies of the man as king or to his role as viewed by his former subjects at present. Despite Carol's urge to override the constitution and to rule both as a benevolent and as a selfish despot, he was a serious and a competent executive. While he is certainly no ascetic, there is no reason to attribute the numerous ugly aspects of Rumanian politics to Carol's preoccupation with pleasure or to the baneful influence of his mistress.

Returning to Rumania in 1930, almost five years after he renounced his right of succession, Carol found a shaky government under Maniu, which had for a brief period ousted the powerful Liberals in 1928. Although Carol's return had been arranged by Maniu and although the king could not hope for anything but hostility from the Liberals, who had sent him

into exile, he nevertheless managed to render himself independent of both camps. Distressed by the discovery that Carol had smuggled his mistress into the country and had thus destroyed all possibility of a reconciliation with the Queen, the somewhat puritanical Maniu withdrew from active leadership in the uphill struggle to solve Rumania's problems in a democratic manner. With Maniu in retirement, Carol manoeuvered himself into a position in which he began to dominate the government.

As a constitutional ruler Carol II had little difficulty in developing his personal popularity among the people. He was the first native Rumanian scion of the dynasty and as such an ideal personification of the triumphant national pride of Greater Rumania. During the first six years of his reign, his schedule comprised 50 public addresses as well as frequent tours of the country. The schools maintained by the state naturally inculcated admiration for the monarch and the Orthodox and Uniate churches as a matter of course reinforced this influence. Carol also showed considerable concern for the peasantry and supported the work of the sociologist, Professor Dimitrie Gusti, who sent university students into the villages to conduct field work and to raise the standard of life in backward districts. The King also initiated a Scout movement, subsidized by public funds, adopting the slogan of "Faith and Work for Country and King," and arranged for state encouragement for sports, both of which served to increase his popularity in non-political circles. A semi-official biographer credits him with such activities as improvement of sanitation, creation of a State tourist agency, construction of roads and hospitals, the urban development of Bucharest, and industrial expositions.

During the years 1933-37 the Liberal Party recovered full control of the government, and Carol managed to make his peace with them, while steadily asserting his personal will in public affairs. The King was certainly aware that the Liberal regime was thoroughly corrupt and that it was more concerned with the desires of the industrial banking and commercial interests, as well as with maintaining an enormous amount of patronage for its politicians, than with democratic rights or the plight of the majority of the peasants. But Carol too showed little concern over such evils and there is good reason to believe that under his paternalistic cloak the King utilized his position to build up a large personal fortune. His account with one American broker showed, at the end of 1943, a balance of about $900,000.

By the end of 1937 the misrule of the Liberals, aided and abetted by the king, had run its course. In the elections of 20 December the Liberals polled 36 percent of the votes, thus falling short of the 40 percent needed, (by the somewhat unusual Rumanian rule,) to give them the right to remain in power; the several other parties received smaller fractions of the total vote. This unprecedented situation gave Carol his opportunity to seize the reins and establish a personal dictatorship. He chose as his Premier the late Octavian Goga, whose pro-fascist National Christian party had obtained less than 10 percent of the votes cast in the election, An avowed totalitarian regime was installed. On 18 January 1938 Carol dissolved the newly elected Parliament before it was convened and dissuaded the Liberal leaders from joining the Peasant party in an anti-fascist bloc. The new constitution, presented to the demoralized population the following month, vested in

the king the right to rule by decree, and reduced the legislature to an advisory function.

The one domestic problem which continued to elude Carol's high-handed maneuvers was the Iron Guard. Led by Corneliu Codreanu and other demagogic terrorists, this party was noted for its violent tactics, including assassination of Premier Ion Duca in 1933 and sporadic pogroms. The fascist program of the Iron Guard differed little from the regime instituted in 1938, but Codreanu was denied a share in the government and was treated by the King as public enemy no. 1. On 17 April 1938 Codreanu was arrested together with a group of his henchmen, who received a prison sentence on the charge of plotting against the state with foreign (German) support. Inasmuch as the law precluded capital punishment, Carol resorted to illegal execution. On 30 November 1938 the Rumanian public received fresh evidence of the King's disregard for justice in the form of an official release stating that Codreanu and his fellow prisoners had been shot while trying to escape.

It cannot be denied that Carol as dictator introduced reforms in the national finances and checked the corruption which was flourishing among government officials. A British observer of this period, Sir Charles Petrie, reported that the population had "a very wholesome respect" for the King. Nevertheless, in his desire to steal the thunder of the Iron Guard, Carol encouraged Goga to make overtures to the Rome-Berlin Axis, and fully supported the anti-Jewish measures which were virtually first to be enforced under the new regime. Carol abandoned the standard foreign policy of Rumania, which since 1919 had been oriented toward France and England, and which had supported the League of Nations against Germany

and Italy. When at the end of six weeks it became apparent that Goga's drastic methods were only adding to the chaos, Carol dismissed him and gave the premiership to the Patriarch, of the Rumanian Church, the late Miron Cristea, who continued the dictatorial regime in a somewhat subdued form.

The pro-German policy could not be maintained in Bucharest after the Munich conference. The weakened position of Czechoslovakia meant the loss of a vital source of Rumania's munition supply, and placed Hungary in a position to intensify its demand for the return of Transylvania. It was such considerations, rather than preference in principle for relations with democratic powers, which caused Carol to look to Paris and London for support. Nor did this reversion to the foreign policy of 1919-37 have any repercussions in domestic affairs. After the dismissal of Goga, Carol justified his regime in an interview with A. L. Easterman, correspondent for the London Daily Herald, in the following terms: "The role of the sovereign in Rumania is not that of the monarch in other countries. The King in other countries must do what his ministers tell him. Here the ministers do what I tell them. Why is this so? It is because of parties and politics in this country. The only element in the state which can maintain a strict line between them and so make for stability is the Sovereign. That is the reason for the difference between the place of the monarch in my country and elsewhere." In statements intended for home consumption the King and his spokesmen were even more emphatic in expressing their preference for a royal dictatorship.

The martyrdom of Codreanu was effectively exploited by the Iron Guard, which renewed its agitation against the King,

whom they alleged to be dominated by wealthy Jews and by an insidious mistress of Jewish parentage. The Iron Guard position was strengthened both by direct German subsidies and by the expansion of German power; the destruction of the Czechoslovak state, 15 March 1939, was followed closely by a 10-year trade agreement between Germany and Rumania, signed 23 March. Ten weeks later, when Carol convoked his new hand-picked Parliament, designed to comprise representatives of all parties except the Iron Guard, and having a lower house organized on a corporative basis (as in Italy), the three leading senators of the Peasant party (Maniu, Mihalache and Lupu) as well as the Liberal leader, the late Vintila Bratianu, refused to take the prescribed fascist oath and were ousted, 8 June 1939. The political isolation of the King gave added impetus to the Iron Guard, which staged an unsuccessful putsch on 21 September, for which many of the participants paid with their lives.

The appointment of Tatarescu to the premiership in November 1939, after Calinescu's assassination by an Iron Guardist, represented Carol's bid for British and French support against the evident intention of Hungary, as an Axis ally, to make good its claim to Transylvania. But an autocrat who had imposed fascism and ignored the democratic elements, while at the same time antagonizing the great fascist powers, could scarcely hope to save his throne and his country's independence. Following the fall of France, Carol acknowledged the collapse of his policy, 21 June 1940, by founding the "Party of the Nation," a political group which, inviting the membership of all parties and representatives of the minority nationalities (except the Jews), made room for the first time

since 1938 for the Iron Guard. Indeed, the new cabinet, appointed 4 July 1940, was headed by a highly respectable supporter of Codreanu, the industrialist Ion Gigurtu, who assigned the portfolio of National Culture to Horia Sima, Codreanu's successor as head of the Guardist movement.

The advent of the Iron Guard regime followed immediately upon the humiliating cession of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina to the Soviet Union, which marked the passing of Greater Rumania. By the beginning of September Axis representatives had compelled Rumania to yield northern Transylvania to Hungary and southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, so that the losses totaled a third of the population of the kingdom and over a fifth of its area. The ground had been cut from under Carol's throne and on 5 September he transferred the premiership to General Ion Antonescu, known for his hostility to the king and his sympathy for the Iron Guard's program, as distinguished from its tactics. The ghost of Codreanu was represented in this government by Horia Sima, who became Vice-Premier. When Antonescu promptly proceeded to force Carol to abdicate, he was upheld by the same Peasant party leader, Iuliu Maniu, who had in 1930 brought the king back from exile. Thus, Carol had ruled long enough to receive the full blame for all the ills suffered by Rumania since the end of 1937, and salvaged only his personal fortune, which had been prudently transferred to the U. S. and other havens in the West.

Carol's escape from the Continent was impeded by the German government's pressure on Madrid, and he failed to receive American official aid, which he undoubtedly hoped for. He finally extricated himself from Portugal and was permitted to settle in Mexico. During the early part of his stay he

endeavored to obtain permission to move to the U.S., but found that he was persona non grata. As a private citizen, Carol's mistress accompanied him into exile. Politically, he is likewise an undesirable guest; the ex-king has been repudiated by Rumanian-Americans (with the exception of a minority whose loyalty to democracy is open to question), and is openly opposed by Charles A. Davila, former Rumanian minister to the U.S., who since losing his post in 1938 has been regarded as the spokesman for the democratic elements of his native land.

Following a period of obscurity and silence, during the fall of 1943, Carol made an ill-starred effort to obtain a hearing before the American public. Shortly after he had hired a New York publicity agent, he was the subject of sympathetic notice in the press. On 7 November, the American press printed a proclamation by Carol to the Rumanian people, and serious attempts were made to create the impression that the King was both an authority on Balkan problems and a democratic refugee from Hitlerism. With the approval of the U. S. Office of Censorship, CBS announced that on 23 November Carol would boradcast from Mexico City, but on the afternoon of that day the approval was rescinded and the broadcast cancelled.

Still in the prime of life at the age of 51, and eager to reclaim his heritage, Carol is now biding his time until Rumania is liberated from German control. Whether young King Michael will volunteer to abdicate in favor of his father cannot be predicted, but he would probably not oppose any decision by the Allies on this question. There is also the possibility that the Germans may remove Michael from the

scene when they leave Rumania, and may even put him to death. In that event, Carol's claim to the throne, if there is to be a throne, will be greatly reinforced. In any case the ex-King may be expected to continue to press his claims as an opponent of Germany and a sincere ally of Great Britain and the U. S. He has the funds for such a publicity campaign, and undoubtedly has highly-placed friends inside Rumania to pave the way for his return.

Michael, only child of Carol and Helen, has been carefully educated under his father's direction. Now in his twenty-third year, this King has never been entrusted with any responsibility and hashad scarcely any opportunity of making his views known. Marshal Antonescu, his father's enemy, has made sure to keep him isolated. The personal enmity between the two men is reported to be enhanced by more profound points of disagreement. Since the expulsion of the Soviet forces from Bessarabia and Bucovina during the summer of 1941, Michael is reported to have opposed the Marshal's policy of collaboration with the Germans and aggression against the USSR. Although the King has little cause to feel cordial toward Maniu, likewise his father's enemy, he supports Maniu's opposition. In taking this stand, it is believed that Michael is seconded by the Queen Mother, a Greek princess who is said to favor the Anglo-American cause. During the summer of 1943 a Rumanian diplomat in a neutral capital, whose pro-Allied sympathies are beyond suspicion, informed British and American representatives that he was in receipt of a message from the King authorizing him to arrange for Rumania's surrender to the Allies.

According to an unconfirmed report, during 1943 Antonescu decided to get rid of the young monarch and arranged to send

him to Germany. The attempt is said to have been blocked by certain influential military men, which would indicate an important source of support for Michael.

It is likewise reported that when Alexandru Cretzianu was made Minister to Turkey in 1943, despite his known opposition to the Antonescu regime, the appointment was due to the insistence of the King, with the result that Rumania now has a diplomat in Ankara whose political record makes him a suitable man to treat with the British and American representatives. That Maniu and Bratianu, as the leaders of the pro-Allied opposition, attach importance to Michael's potentialities is attested by their procedure in connection with their joint memorandum addressed to Antonescu, 12 August 1943. For the first time the opposition leaders sent a copy of their message, embodying a further protest against the continuation of hostilities on the side of Germany, to the King as the constitutional source of the Marshal's powers. The King, however, felt constrained to decline this communication on the ground that he was utterly powerless.

A Rumanian, who claims to have had an audience with Michael last December, states that the King has not forgiven Antonescu for declaring war on the USSR without consulting him, and that Michael has no intention of attempting to escape from the country, even if it were possible to elude the Marshal. The same source likewise asserts that the King retains his hold on the people, who appreciate his predicament.

The establishment of a popular government after the war will be quite compatible with the retention of the monarchy as an institution. The presence or absence of a particular king, on the other hand, should in itself not be expected to

affect the political stability of the state either for better or for worse. Both the Liberal and Peasant parties favor a constitutional monarchy, just as they both oppose the restoration of Carol. Whether they would modify their present stand if the throne were to become vacant, must remain an open question. Moreover, in view of the political backwardness of the Rumanian masses, it is doubtful whether the events of recent years have taught them any lesson as to the limited usefulness of even a strong king during an international crisis. However, without ruling out the possibility of a progressive trend in Rumanian politics, a republican movement would be a surprising development. The general population has never been permitted to express itself freely with regard to any particular king, let alone opposition to the monarchic institution.

IV. YUGOSLAVIA

The present Yugoslav king, representing the only native Balkan dynasty, except for King Zog, is the descendant of the first King of the Serbs, then as now a peasant people, with no aristocracy or middle class. In 1804, George Petrovich Karageorge (Black George), "the father of Serbia," was chosen by a national assembly at Orashats to lead the Serb revolt against Turkish domination. An untutored peasant, he became the founder of a dynasty because of his military ability and natural force of character. In his early manhood he gained some military experience as a volunteer in the Austrian Army, but he had also acted on his own initiative as a Haiduk (outlaw) in the mountains. He was a skillful diplomatist, both in dealing with his own people, whom he had to educate in the elementary idea of unity, and in playing off Austria and Russia against Turkey without compromising Serbian independence.

On 1 August 1806, he successfully led a force of 9,000 Serbs against 30,000 Turks at Mishar, one of the most significant victories in the Serb rebellion against the Turks. However, during the Turkish offensive of 1813 against the outnumbered Serbs, he deserted his men for unknown reasons and fled over the Danube into Austria (Zemun) and then to Odessa. But in 1817, at a time when Milosh Obrenovich, another Serb leader, was negotiating with the Turks, Karageorge returned to Serbia as an agent of the Greek revolutionary society, the Ethnike Hetaireia, to induce the Serbians to stage a rising to coincide with a Greek revolt. Milosh, however, had him beheaded on 13 July 1817, and thus started a long blood-feud between supporters of the two native

dynasties, which continued until 1903. Milosh became "Supreme Chief," and, in 1830, hereditary Prince.

Prince Milosh Obrenovich was devious, avaricious, and unpopular; in 1839 he was forced to abdicate and leave the country, and his elder son Milan succeeded to the throne in 1840. Milan, however, died after some weeks and was succeeded by his younger brother, Michael. During Prince Michael's reign, Alexander Karageorgevich, son of Karageorge, acted as his adjutant, and in 1842 when Prince Michael was expelled from the throne Alexander succeeded him.

Alexander Karageorgevich, unlike his father, Karageorge, was a person of weak character, ad constantly at odds with his subjects. They saw that he did not resist their ancient enemy, Turkey, and that he had shown complete subservience to Austria, which they hated almost as much. The Serbs lost patience with him, and a conspiracy of his own Senators was organized to murder him. This failing, a meeting of the Skupshtina (Assembly) was called to force his resignation in 1858. Milosh Obrenovich was recalled; but he was a man of seventy-eight and his reign lasted only twenty months. After his death in 1860, he was succeeded for the second time by his son Michael, able but unpopular and dictatorial, who was assassinated in 1868 by adherents of the Karageorgeviches. He in turn was succeeded by his cousin Milan, a somewhat unbalanced person, during whose long reign the first Serb attempt to gain Bosnia and Herzegovina failed, and the first unfortunate enmity with Bulgaria arose. In 1882 Milan became King of Serbia; in 1889 he abdicated in favor of his son Alexander, an unstable youth, who then married Draga Mashin, a woman with a questionable past. On 11 June 1903, Alexander

and Draga were brutally murdered in the Royal Palace on the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of Prince Michael's murder. The assassins were young Serbian officers, organized in a Secret Society called the Black Hand, whose ringleader was Dimitriyevich, nicknamed "Apis." The Premier, the War Minister, and the Queen's two brothers shared their fate.

Until this time the mass of the peasantry had taken no part in the political lief of the country. The villages were physically and culturally neglected, while the towns prospered with the development of commerce under the protection of the State. This created a deep gulf of hatred and suspicion between town and village. This antagonism was basically economic, but was intensified by the heterogeneous character of the city population, which consisted largely of Armenians, Jews, Greeks, and other Levantines who intermarried among themselves and became known as the Charshiya. They dominated Serb politics, and the first "grass-roots" political movement in Serbia started as a protest by the peasantry against the central power of the State and the Charshiya. It was led by Nikola Pashich, whose extraordinary political career extended from 1870 to 1926. Pashich and his group created the Serb Radical Party, which had the support of the overwhelming majority of Serb peasants. During the reign of the last two Obrenovich kings (Milan and Alexander), the leaders of the Radical Party, including Pashich, betrayed their peasant supporters and became "loyal servants" of the Court. With their connivance, Serbia was ruled by the police and the army. In 1903 Pashich's party helped the Karageorgeviches regain the throne, and thus established a personal bond between the Karageorgeviches and the Radical Party which has continued to the present day.

After the last Obrenovich was murdered Serbia found herself the pariah of Europe. England broke off diplomatic relations for three years until the assassins were removed from office. Russia and Austria, however, granted almost immediate recognition of the new King Peter I, third son of the exiled Alexander Karageorgevich. Peter had served in the French Army in 1870, had fought the Turks side by side with the Bosnian insurgents in 1876, had translated John Stuart Mill into Serbian, and was innocent of complicity in the Obrenovich murders. He became known as the "Great Liberator" of Serbia. During the eleven years of his reign the country showed a marked improvement in every sphere of public life. Until ill health forced him to appoint his son, Prince Alexander, as Regent in June 1914, his was the first genuinely democratic regime which Serbia had experienced.

Serbia became a democratic national state, which inspired all other Yugoslavs to fight for their freedom and independence The Montenegrins, likewise, had their independent state, which was ruled by the autocratic local dynasty, the Petroviches. The Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs of Voyvodina, Bosnia, Herzegovnia, and Croatia, however, were incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which suppressed all Slav political movements, practiced religious intolerance, and upheld feudalism. The outbreak of the first World War was, of course, largely due to Serb desire to free these other Slavs.

In the summer of 1917, the Serbian government and a committee of other South Slavs issued a manifesto proclaiming a "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," which was to be a democratic and parliamentary monarchy under the Karageorgewich dynasty, giving equality of treatment to the three

religions, Orthodox, Catholic, and Moslem, and using both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. Meanwhile, Pashich and young Prince Alexander, now collaborating with a group of officers who were rivals to the Black Hand and called themselves the White Hand, conducted the notorious Salonika Trials, really a purge of the army. "Apis" and others were killed on trumped-up charges of having plotted to assassinate Alexander. A leading figure in this purge was Petar Zhivkovich, a former member of the Black Hand, who had opened the Palace gates to the murderers of Alexander and Draga Obrenovich. He and Pashich and Alexander were linked by the strongest personal ties.

After the purge, the Karageorgevich dynasty returned safely to a newly created state, which had been proclaimed in Belgrade on 1 December 1918. Serbian nationalistic ambitions had been fulfilled, and the Slavs formerly under Austria had all been liberated and included in the new state, the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. The Serbs had just finished a victorious war, and had marched back to Belgrade with a disciplined army, a diplomatic corps, and a King.

The question whether the people favored the monarch was not permitted to be raised, but there is little doubt that a plebiscite at that time would have endorsed the dynasty. Partly because of Italian claims to the Dalmatian coast, the Serb, Croat, and Slovene Kingdom was formed hastily, and with no preliminary constitutional understanding as to the relative autonomy of its component regions. From the first, the crucial political issue was between Centralism and Federalism, the former being more in consonance with the dominant practice in

the small pre-war Serbia, the latter with the diversified practice of the Habsburg Monarchy. Many Serbs felt that the new state was really a Greater Serbia, and favored centralization, while many Croats and Slovenes and some Serbs wanted a Yugoslav or South Slav federation with much local autonomy. The Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day, 28 June 1921) Constitution was drafted by Pashich, and reflected the Serb Radical Party's Centralist views.

The Constitution naturally proved unacceptable not only to a great majority of the Croats and Slovenes, who opposed the Radical Party's dictatorial methods, but to many Serbs also. Opposition was so strong that an attempt was made on Alexander's life in Belgrade at the ratification ceremony. This produced a series of decrees authorizing the most drastic and elastic measures against terrorists. No party organized along "communist" lines was allowed to exist, which meant not merely suppression of the Communist Party itself, but of any political group opposed to Pashich's Radical party, which received the King's permission to remain in power. At this time the bitter antagonism of the Croats toward the Government, and a widespread leaning toward republicanism began to take shape.

On 20 June 1928 on the floor of Parliament a Montenegrin deputy of the Radical Party, a pan-Serb in outlook, shot and killed Stepan Radich, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, together with two other Croat deputies. Dr. Machek was elected Radich's successor by the Croat Peasant deputies, but he refused to return to Belgrade until Croat grievances were redressed. The constitutional monarchy had failed, and a large measure of the blame for the failure fell upon the

King himself. He had deliberately chosen to keep in power Pashich's Serb Radical Party, and had tried to force a centralized administration upon a newly created country composed of seven diverse provinces. The members of the so-called Charshiya, which by now amounted to a sort of Serb Tammany Hall, had distributed the most important positions in the diplomatic service, the army, the police, the judiciary, and other state institutions to Serbs from Serbia. Croat Peasants and Serb Democrats had formed a coalition to force decentralization in the regime.

Alexander, fearing that his throne would eventually become insecure if he permitted federalization and curbs upon the royal power, abolished the Vidovdan Constitution on 6 January 1929, and substituted 21 provisional articles in its place. He then appointed as Premier General Petar Zhivkovich, now Commander of the Royal Guard. Of the eighteen whom Zhivkovich invited to join the first non-constitutional cabinet, five were Croats, one was a Slovene, and the remaining twelve were Serbs most of whom were affiliated with the Radical party. All political parties were outlawed, and no new party could be formed without official sanction by the Crown. A censorship law prevented political discussion through newspapers. Thus, freedom of speech and of the press was abolished. A royal dictatorship had been established and political life brought to an end.

Initial cooperation with the King slowly disappeared, and skepticism rapidly gained ground. The King had failed to realize that the failures of the past decade had arisen from his unwillingness to disentangle three basic problems: the trial of strength between Serb and Croat, which was largely

a struggle between centralist and regional ideas; the need for the establishment of constitutional government; and economic and social problems which had their roots in the national and constitutional issues. In his efforts to break the passive resistance of the Croats, he had only succeeded in united them as never before. In his efforts to strengthen the Serb element in the State, and thus to unify Yugoslavia, he only hastened the disintegration of Serbian political unity. The King was a soldier who had fought through the Balkan and World Wars. He was not a politician, and it was only his moral courage that prompted him to take the entire responsibility for his moves on his own shoulders. The change of the country's name to Yugoslavia, and the abolition of the historical South Slav provinces, which were replaced by newly created administrative divisions (the Banovinas) were gestures designed to create unity, but they did not go to the roots of the problem.

Alexander's failure to make any concessions to the Croats resulted in the formation of terrorist groups abroad, sponsored by Yugoslavia's enemies. Among these groups was the well-known Ustasha organization (the insurgents) whose leader, Ante Pavelich, is the present "Poglavnik" or Fuehrer of the Axis-created "Independent" State of Croatia. This Croat group, the successor of the fanatically nationalistic Frank party, was formed in the autumn of 1932 in Italy, where Pavelich lived most of the time he was in exile. Supported by Austria, Italy and Hungary, this group operated in Yugoslavia with the avowed purpose of undermining the royal dictatorship by terroristic acts which might eventually lead to the emancipation of Croatia from the rule of Belgrade. The King's police on their side,

however, also perpetrated acts of terror, not only against the Croats but against all opposition. From 1931 to 1933 a long series of outrages were staged or connived at by the police. Pavelich's group retaliated with organized terror supported by Italian supplies and finance. All of these events encouraged two extremist ideologies to take hold of the masses and to endanger the existence of the state. These two anti-Yugoslav philosophies were the theory of a "Greater Serbia" and the theory of "Independent Croatia." Meanwhile, the moderates, both Croats and Serbs, lent the King no support because they disapproved his methods.

The unrest in Yugoslavia was increased in 1933 when Hitler came to power, and again in 1934 by the Dollfuss regime's attack on the Socialists in Vienna. Alexander, who was abler in international than in domestic affairs, began diplomatic negotiations to form a Balkan Entente, to implement the pro-French and little Entente foreign policy which Yugoslavia had always followed. His plans for a Balkan consolidation in view of the disturbing developments in Central Europe took him to France on an official visit early in October 1934. On 9 October 1934, while driving through the streets of Marseilles, he was assassinated, and the French Foreign Minister, M. Barthou, mortally wounded. Though the assassin himself was a Macedonian terrorist, it was soon discovered that the real director of the crime was Ante Pavelich, whom Mussolini was using for his own purposes, then as afterwards.

After the assassination of King Alexander, his dictatorial powers passed into the hands of his first cousin, Prince Paul, chief of a three-man-Regency appointed in

Alexander's will for his eleven year old son, Peter. The other two members were Dr. Stankovich (a distinguished Serb and Professor Medicine at Belgrade University), and Dr. Perovich (a Dalmatian Croat official, for a time Ban of the Savska Banovina). They soon faded into the background, and Prince Paul took over the actual reins of power. Prince Paul, whose mother had been a member of the Russian aristocracy, had acquired a great fear of communism. He was not at home in Yugoslavia, and did not understand the people, whom he regarded with suspicion. He was not eligible for succession to the throne, because in 1903, when King Peter I and his male heirs had been elected to the throne, no reference was made to his younger brother Arsen, or the latter's only son, Paul.

Paul's Regency carried on King Alexander's policies, and worked with the Yugoslav National Party headed by General Zhivkovich. On 23 June 1935, Stoyadinovich became Premier, and shortly thereafter the first moves toward Germany were initiated. Stoyadinovich organized a "Yugoslav Radical Party," actually the successor of Pashich's Party, but made no progress toward solving the Croat or constitutional problems. Visits of Ciano and von Neurath to Belgrade in 1937 indicated that Paul was moving toward the fascist powers.

The seizure of Prague by Hitler in March 1939 forced a settlement of the Croat issue. Prince Paul and Machek concluded an agreement on 26 August for the creation of a new "Croatian" Banovina, which was to have autonomy in local matters. By dealing directly with Prince Paul, and not consulting his Serb allies in the opposition, Machek aroused distrust and hostility. He joined Paul's government as Vice-Premier.

German military successes during 1939 and 1940 brought sorrow to the Yugoslav people; but Paul declined a Turkish alliance at a time when it might have helped Greece and his own country against the Axis. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria went over to the Germans, and Hitler freely applied pressure to the Yugoslavs. On 3 March 1941, Prince Paul went to Berchtesgaden where Hitler probably told him about his plans against Russia; negotiations with the Germans were undertaken; and on 25 March the Premier and Foreign Minister signed the Axis Pact. Yugoslavia's military unpreparedness, Paul's own obsession with Bolshevism, and his love of personal power all led to this decision, which was entirely repugnant to the people.

When they were informed of the Pact, 26 March 1941, there were violent demonstrations which resulted in a bloodless coup d'etat the following day. Its suddenness and complete success was probably due to the participation of several elements: first, the younger army officers as contrasted to the old line Serb Generals; all the old Serbian parties, especially those of the left; and the students, the Orthodox clergy, and hierarchy. Young King Peter's majority was proclaimed (though he was not to be 18 until the following September), and General Simovich of the Air Force was made Prime Minister of the new Government which was more representative than any other ever formed in Yugoslavia, but still included General Zhivkovich. Despite the preliminary efforts to conciliate the Germans, Hitler invaded on 6 April. The country was overrun, and King Peter II and his military Government fled the country.

Since April 1941 the old issue of Serbian hegemony as against Yugoslav federation, has remained paramount. This conflict is largely responsible for the civil war now being waged between Mihailovich, who represents the Great Serb view, and the Partisans, who represent the federal Yugoslav view of the Old Opposition. On the outcome of their struggle the return of the Karageorge dynasty and King Peter may depend. To many Yugoslavs at home, the King and the dynasty are associated with the clique who misruled the nation, who fled the country when the enemy entered it, and who today are seeking from exile to rule the country and plan its future.

During the period when he was fighting to free the country from the invader, the people of Yugoslavia admired Mihailovich. When it became known, however, that he had decided to conserve his forces, and that his political aims were the re-establishment of the Karageorgevich dynasty and the creation of a Greater Serbia, his popularity became restricted to Serbia proper.

In the remainder of the country, the Partisan movement, at first largely communist in leadership, attracted to itself the political leaders who had opposed the Royal dictatorship. Many Serbs joined its ranks, including large numbers of Yugoslav army officers dissatisfied with Mihailovich's tactics. It is reliably estimated that the movement is now about 60 percent Serb in membership. King Peter, young and inexperienced, surrounded by increasingly reactionary pan-Serb advisers, including the inevitable General Zhivkovich, has denounced the Partisans as communists and terrorists.

In December 1943 their leader, Tito, replied by announcing the formation of his own provisional Government, representing all the diverse political and social elements of the

country. The Partisans on 29 November 1943 issued the so-called "Yaitse Declaration," which denounced the King and denied his right to return unless a national plebiscite, to be held after the war, should demand it. This is still Tito's position, although he understands that the British, who have decided to render him all military aid, nonetheless continue to recognize King Peter's Government, as do the U. S. and the USSR. The Western Allies have, at least temporarily, withdrawn their missions to Mihailovich.

At present the British Foreign Office is trying to solve the delicate situation. Peter is in London (April 1944), and pressure is being brought to bear on him to drop those members of his entourage most objectionable to Tito (including, of course, Mihailovich), and to arrive, at least for the duration of the war, at some modus vivendi with the movement which appears to the British to represent, so far as can be determined, the present desires of the Yugoslav people.

King Peter's present popularity in Yugoslavia cannot be finally assessed. It is possible, however, by analysis of recent intelligence, to arrive at an approximation. To the Serbs in "Old Serbia" (perhaps 4,000,000 of Yugoslavia's estimated 14,500,000 people), the name Karageorge is still one to conjure with. Peter's remote ancestor was the founder of a nationalist Serbia and freed them from the Turkish yoke at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Karageorgeviches led them through the Balkan wars, and liberated Serbia. They also led them through the World War, which brought about the downfall of the Habsburg Empire, and achieved Serb dreams of expansion. It is true that during the last two decades, Serb devotion to the only national dynasty in the Balkans

dwindled somewhat. Small Republican parties arose, mainly because of the Royal dictatorship of King Alexander, but an overwhelming majority of the Serb element continued to respect the dynasty. German and Mihailovich propaganda has presented the Partisans as Communists who will take away the Peasants land. This has confirmed them in their anti-Partisan views. This is further indicated by the recent sympathy shown to Peter in the German-dominated press of Nedich's puppet Serbia. It can safely be assumed that the majority of the Serbs in "Old Serbia" desire the return of their dynasty. They continue to support Mihailovich because he represents the King. But even in Serbia, the people would not tolerate a reestablishment of the royal dictatorship.

The remainder of the Serbs in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and the Voyvoydina (about 3,000,000) do not have the same devotion for the dynasty as those in Serbia proper. There is not enough evidence yet available to say what views are held by the majority of the elements in these areas. The Montenegrins in particular, for example, who have had their own dynasty in the past, always resented the neglect which the Belgrade regimes showed them.

For the Croats (about 6,500,000) the Karageorge dynasty was at no time more than a means of arriving at a solution for the creation of Yugoslavia. They accepted it in preference to the Hapsburgs. However, their first experience with the dynasty was a bitter one, and has turned them against the re-establishment even of a constitutional Karageorgevich monarchy.

The Slovenes (about 1,000,000) under their former clerical leaders generally supported Belgrade. It is in Slovenia, however, that the Partisan movement has registered perhaps its

greatest successes. Only a small percentage of Slovenes still supports the Clericals. It is probably safe to say that the majority now opposes the return of the dynasty.

Even if some amicable arrangement can be reached between Peter and Tito, in order to receive the support of a free plebiscite after the war Peter will presumably have to make adjustments in policy of an entirely unprecedented sort. Nothing in his previous career suggests that he is capable of doing so. He has been unable to acquire genuine political experience. This is almost entirely because of the calibre of his advisers. It is of some significance, however, that he receives for his personal support the enormous sum of $650,000 annually. With so much money to spend in London and Cairo, so young a man could hardly be expected to perceive the realities of his country's position. Indeed, he is said by his detractors to be frivolous in his attitude toward politics, and his recent marriage to Princess Alexander of Greece is regarded by them as an instance of his putting his personal interests ahead of his patriotic duty. It is not entirely clear, however, what the reasoning is behind this last charge.

V. ALBANIA

Monarchy in Albania dates from 1913, when, at the close of the Balkan War which abolished Turkish rule in Europe, the Great Powers decided to recognize Albania as an independent principality. A petty German prince, Wilhelm zu Wied, was consequently established as "Mbret" or prince of Albania in March 1914. Backed by foreign powers who were more interested in preventing Serb and Greek expansion and in blocking each other than in Albanian nationalism, Wied had a great deal of trouble maintaining his authority against various native leaders. With the outbreak of World War I, his position became so untenable that he was forced to flee in September 1914, leaving Albania without unified government.

The significance of Wied's brief reign lies chiefly in the establishment of a monarchical precedent in independent Albania. Both he and his son, who now reside in Bucharest, are presumably available to return to the throne, but their previous experience would suggest that there would be little reason for them to do so. Wied is not an Albanian; he ruled under foreign sponsorship; and he personally made little impression on the Albanian population, although a number of elder Albanian politicians are still personally attached to him. The real dynastic problem in Albania is centered around Zog I, now in exile, who still claims to be "King of the Albanians."

Ahmed Bey Zogu was born in 1895 of a long line of hereditary chieftains of the Mati tribe. A Sunni Moslem educated at Istanbul, he first became prominent immediately after World War I when the Italians were trying to establish a protectorat

over Albania. The government at the time was in the hands of a Regency which had been set up by a congress of Albanian patriots, continuing the form established by the Powers when they created the principality under Wilhelm zu Wied. Zogu and his tribesmen undertook to back the authority of the new government, and were instrumental in forcing the Italians to withdraw their troops. In 1920, the Great Powers for a second time decided to recognize Albanian independence, and admitted Albania into the League of Nations, with the proviso, however, that Italy would have the right to intervene should self-government break down in the new state. The fact that such a contingency never arose was largely due to Zogu's forceful but effective efforts. Becoming first Minister of the Interior and then Prime Minister, he suppressed a number of revolts during the early twenties, and managed to remain in power even when technically out of office. In 1924, a successfuly uprising forced him into exile for six months, but after acquiring Yugoslav support, he returned to Albania, displaced the liberal regime of Bishop Fan Noli, and declared Albania a Republic with himself as president.

Although Zogu had returned from exile with Yugoslav aid, his great need of funds led him into close relations with the Italians, who, having failed to secure a mandate over Albania, were only too willing to extend large loans in exchange for the tacit privileges of economic and political infiltration. In fact, Albanian poverty and Italian designs were the ruling factors in Albania's foreign relations under the Zogist regime. Italy virtually subsidized the Albanian government, floated an Albanian national bank, provided "advisors," and successfully silenced Zogu's occasional objections to these threats to Albanian independence by offering substantial personal bribes.

Although Zogu was at first able to withstand Italian encroachments, a serious revolt in 1926 provided Italy with an excuse to press further demands, which he was in no position to refuse. A pact was duly signed giving Italy the right to interfere "with any disturbance...directed against the status quo political, juridical, or territorial" of Albania. This pact was followed a year later by a bilateral defensive alliance.

By 1928, Zogu had managed to suppress any effective internal opposition. He therefore set about perpetuating his rule by transforming the so-called Republic into a monarchy. The official excuse for the change was that the Albanians understood the title of King but not that of President. Though there is possibly some truth in this, the status of their ruler made little actual difference to the Albanians, since Zogu as president was already exercising the powers of an absolute monarch. The government-inspired demonstrations of enthusiasm were mainly intended to impress foreign powers, and to secure international recognition of Zogu as "Zog I, King of the Albanians."

In the years following his accession to the throne, Zog's position with regard to Italy became increasingly difficult. By urging the maintenance of a large and expensive army, by withholding payments on promised loans, and by generally embarrassing the Albanian exchequer, the Italians continued to seek control over all the governmental functions in Albania. This infiltration inevitably gave rise to anti-Italian sentiment which reflected on Zog's own reputation with his subjects. The Albanians resented the fact that, in many cases, the proceeds of the loans which were jeopardizing their independence were being spent on public projects, which were either un-

necessary or never got completed, or were going into the private purses of the court circle. By 1931, feeling had risen so high that Zog, always in fear of his life, was attacked by assassins while on a trip to Vienna. It is to Zog's credit, however, that when pressed too far, he refused to comply with Italian demands. He counterbalanced his Italian-sponsored army by keeping his own tribesmen under arms and by maintaining an efficient, British-run gendarmerie. When promised funds were not forthcoming, he drastically cut the national budget rather than agree to Italian demands; and in 1936 his government secured the redemption of Italian loans with only a minimum of political concessions.

In the spring of 1939, having failed to buy sovereignty over Albania, the Italians resorted to open invasion. The Albanians offered little resistance, and the king himself immediately fled, thereby exposing himself to severe criticism from his political opponents. At present, he resides near London with his queen, Geraldine (nee Apponyi, the daughter of the late Count Julius Apponyi and of the former Gladys Virginia Stewart of New York, now Mme. Girault), his infant son, Prince Skander, and his personal entourage, all of whom subsist on a substantial treasure in bullion which he took with him on his flight.

Zog governed Albania under a semi-democratic constitution. In actual practice, however, his government closely resembled the autocratic regime of the Ottoman Turks, who ruled Albania for centuries prior to the acquisition of independence in 1913. The king's power was absolute. He could promulgate decree laws, dismiss parliament, and appoint and dismiss the cabinet. He personally appointed all officials whose salaries exceeded

a certain sum, he commanded the armed forces, and he had the power to declare war. The democratic provisions of the constitution became mere formalities. Ballots were cast, but only those men whose names appeared on a royal list were ever elected; and parliament, which was thus certain to be made up of men upon whom the King could rely, served only to pass laws and a budget dictated from the throne. In short, the King's will permeated every function of the Albanian government.

In order to safeguard his powers, Zog relied heavily on the traditional Eastern practices of personal discrimination and suppression of all opposition. He made every individual and every faction immediately dependent on himself by stimulating rivalries between them which prevented anyone from acquiring too much power and which enabled him to keep a careful check on everyone's activities. The result was a hierarchy of favoritism, making the position of every functionary extremely precarious, and giving enlarged powers to the King's immediate favorites. Personal loyalty to Zog was both a necessity and a distinct advantage. His opponents were conveniently liquidated even if they were residing outside the country. Conversely, a trusted supporter of the King could count on virtual immunity from the law. Murderers and brigands were often released simply because they enjoyed the favor of the King or of someone in his immediate circle.

Other aspects of Zog's regime which run counter to western standards but which were accepted without question under Turkish rule were corruption, graft, and inefficiency. A man was not expected to live on the small government salary provided by the strained Albanian budget. Indeed, among the Turkish-educated officials upon whom Zog largely relied, a

government position was considered a legitimate means of self-enrichment; very few of Zog's entourage failed to avail themselves of the opportunity. Similarly, because of mismanagement, lack of funds, or general inertia, many of the well-intentioned projects decided upon by parliament were executed slowly if at all.

Judged by western standards, Zog's rule was highly irregular, ruthless, and corrupt. However, in a country which had never been exposed to democratic ideas, which was trying to retain a rather shaky independence, and where disorder was endemic, some form of authoritarian government was to be expected. Furthermore, the fourteen years of Zog's administration enabled Albania to make remarkable progress in some respects. The serious and sometimes successful revolts, which hitherto had occurred at least once a year in the natural course of events, were reduced, after 1926, to local uprisings which never threatened the basic authority of the central government. Brigandage and the traditional vendetta, which in some areas had accounted for nearly half the annual mortality among the male population, were drastically reduced by disarming all but Zog's loyal Mati tribe and their allies, the Dibra. Through the vigorous efforts of the gendarmerie and the introduction of modern facilities such as the telephone and telegraph the Albanian people were able to enjoy relative peace and order. Secondly, advances were made in education. For the first time, the Albanians were given the opportunity to learn to read and write their own language; the number of primary and secondary schools increased steadily; and government scholarship to foreign universities were provided for promising candidates. The literacy level remained low, however. Finally,

despite Zog's autocratic methods, a western political outlook had, by the time of the Italian invasion, begun to manifest itself. Foreign schools and administrators within the country, as well as the opportunities for study abroad, led to the growth of the so-called "New Gang," a group of well-trained and able young men who opposed the methods of Zog's administrators. In 1936, this group was allowed to fill the most important government positions and succeeded in giving Albania what is generally conceded to be the best government the country has ever had. It remained in power, however, for only one year. Zog was antagonized by efforts to modify the system of elections, and, having acquired an advantageous settlement with Italy, he felt that a more definitely pro-Italian cabinet was indicated.

Although Zog has recognized the right of the Albanian people to choose their future government, he still claims de jure right to the throne and apparently has every intention of trying to return to Albania after the war. The desirability of reinstating monarchy in Albania is naturally dependent on current public opinion and political trends both inside the country and among Albanians abroad.

An exact estimate of Zog's present popularity with Albania is virtually impossible to obtain. The comparatively primitive state of the country did not lend itself to expression of popular opinion even in pre-war times. Now, after five years of foreign occupation and warfare, the individual Albanian is reported to be generally bitter, and mainly interested in acquiring some degree of security. He is said to fear with equal vehemence the Germans, the Russians, the Western Allies, and the warring Albanian factions. Political affiliations in any given area tend to depend on what military leader is in

power at the moment whether he be pro-Zog, anti-Zog, leftist LNC or rightest BK. Numerical estimates of political opinion are either meaningless or have been prepared with the intention of furthering the ends of one faction or the other.

Clearly-defined opinion for or against Zog, where it does exist, arises in part from tribal loyalties, personal enmities, and individual experience under Zog's regime. Thus Zog's own tribe, the Mati, and the Dibra, who were given the special privilege of carrying arms, would naturally view him with favor, as would many survivors of the Zog bureaucracy. Abas Kupi, leader of the present Zogist movement, was himself an officer in Zog's army. A major part of Kupi's following comes from the Mati and Dibra districts north of Tirana. His program and his personal record as one of the earliest and most active guerrillas enable him to maintain wide connections and have recently placed him in a position where he appears, temporarily at least, to hold the balance of power in the complex struggle among the guerrillas.

In the conservative BK (Balli Kombetar - National Front), which draws a large percentage of its membership from the propertied classes of Albania, the matter of personal experience seems to be the ruling factor. Former political opponents of Zog, who were forced into exile, are naturally opposed to his recall, while former office-holders or the recipients of special privileges, take the opposite view. As originally established, anti-Zog sentiment predominated in the BK, and the movement as a whole was considered republican in outlook. Recently, however, the royalist viewpoint has apparently gained momentum. In some cases, this shift may be due to the influence of collaboration with the Germans

and of participation in the puppet regime headed by a new Regency established by the Germans as a possible tacit indication that Zog might return. In others, despite a basic disapproval of Zog's previous record, it appears to spring from fear of the "communists" and from the belief, more or less reluctant, that he alone can reunite the Albanians and provide some kind of order. Midhat Frasheri, leader of the movement and a former opponent of Zog, has in this way shifted over, and now supports the King's return.

In the LNC (Levizje Nacional Clirimtare, National Liberation Movement) political questions have, until recently, been a matter of secondary importance. The movement as a whole has made active resistance its primary objective, and has apparently taken the Atlantic Charter at face value, believing that the people will be able to choose their own form of government after the war. The question of Zog's return has been virtually ignored. This may have been due in part to the belief that the mass of Albanians are different, if not hostile to the King, but it also may well have been due to a reluctance to antagonize royalist factions while they were still part of the LNC. Abas Kupi, who now leads the Zogist movement, was until November 1943, one of the LNC's most prominent leaders. His recent break with LNC, his open declaration for Zog, his basic conservatism, and his present military inactivity against the Germans, may lead the LNC to become more outspoken.

Now that the royalists have left the movement, the LNC is clearly anti-Zog, and strongly antagonistic to any plans involving the King. Although it maintains certain connections with Tito's Partisans and the Greek EAM, and has a few

communist organizers in its ranks, the term "communist" as applied by its enemies to members of the movement is a misnomer. Tribal authority, strong individualism, the Moslem religion, individual land tenure, and the absence of a proletariat make Albanians unreceptive to communism in the doctrinaire sense. Leading members of the LNC are, rather, idealistic, and wish to see Albania freed of the invader, under a progressive and western administration different from that of Zog.

The outcome of the political rivalry between these various factions will undoubtedly play a large part in determining the character of the future regime. At the time of the Italian capitulation, in the belief that an Allied invasion was imminent, both the LNC and the BK immediately started maneuvering for position in order to be the dominant group when the Allies came in. It was this rivalry which was largely instrumental in precipitating the fratricidal war. The LNC condemns the BK for its passive policy, its collaboration, and its rightist views, while the BK, in turn, considers the "communists" more dangerous in the long run than the Germans. Both sides can probably be expected to continue in this vein, with perhaps individual changes of alliance. Both the BK, with its contingent of educated and prominent Albanians, and the LNC, with its youthful and idealistic following, contain elements which it would be desirable to preserve in Albania.

Abas Kupi's Movement of Legality now makes a third party which is striving for domination. Since his break with the LNC, Kupi's actions have all apparently been directed at acquiring a key position. Once one of the most active guerrilla

leaders, he has recently refrained from resisting the Germans, and has concentrated on enlarging his following. While he personally has avoided overt collaboration, there is ample evidence of his close relations with the Germans and the German-sponsored regime. It would appear that Kupi is prepared to deal with whoever can give his cause the greatest power, whether the Germans, the Allies, or Albanian factions, and that his aim is eventually to impose his policy on the nation at large. Meanwhile, his movement issues propaganda which is well-designed to enhance the King's reputation. It emphasized Zog's desire to give Albania a truly democratic government headed by young, well-educated Albanians rather than by the corrupt and backward politicians upon whom he previously relied; and it promises agrarian reform and guardianship of Albania's ethnic frontiers, both of which are strong political weapons.

At present the political trend is toward an alignment against the LNC of the BK, the Zogists, and the German-sponsored regime. The regime, which includes a number of outstanding Albanians who entered the government only under duress, appears recently to have made overtures for Kupi's support; and the BK with overlapping membership in both the regime and the legitimist movement is predisposed to fall into line. If this trend should produce an actual coalition, it will undoubtedly be strongly royalist and as bitterly opposed to the LNC as is the BK at present.

Outside of the country, Albanian communities in the Near East, England, and the U.S. are divided into two apparently irreconcilable camps. In the Near East, chiefly in Cairo and Istanbul, the majority of Albanians seem to be royalists.

Neither Turkey nor Egypt has ever withdrawn recognition of Zog's de jure right to the throne; so that there is still an Albanian minister in Ankara and a Charge d'Affaires in Cairo. While the Albanians in the Near East are not organized into formal societies, there is a group in Istanbul which is led by Musa Yuka, one of the King's more notoriously corrupt henchmen, who is said to have relatives in the German-sponsored regime and to be distinctly unpopular in Albania.

Albanians in England are relatively few in number, consisting mainly of the King's personal entourage and isolated individuals who are divided on the monarchical issue. There is in addition a society of English friends of Albania called the Anglo-Albanian Association, which, in its original form, was instrumental in obtaining the recognition of Albanian independence in 1920. Its members are mainly wealthy and elderly members of the British aristocracy whose interests are largely centered on charitable institutions in Albania. They favor the return of Zog.

By far the largest Albanian emigrant population is in the United States, where it has aligned itself into two formally organized and mutually hostile societies, one monarchical, the other republican. Vatra ("The Hearth"), the royalist organization, is headed by Bishop Fan Noli, a distinguished liberal who was Prime Minister in 1924. Originally opposed to Zog, he now seems to feel that, for the duration of the war at least, the King is the only figure around whom the Albanians can rally. Founded in 1912, Vatra has a current membership of at least 500. The other organization, Free Albania, claims 1,500 members who favor a Republic and who are ardently opposed to the restoration of Zog. It is led by

Constantine Chekrezi, a consistent critic of the King who was forced to leave the country after participating in a revolt in 1933.

Attempts have been made to unite the two groups in the common interest of establishing a national committee or government in exile, but so far, all efforts have failed. In September 1943, a committee comprising both factions met in London, on Zog's initiative, and drew up a program for a united front under the leadership of the King, and for a plenipotentiary delegation which would attempt to secure recognition of Albania as a member of the United Nations. The program declared the right of the Albanian people to choose their form of government after the war, and asserted Zog's readiness to abide by the results of a plebiscite. The stumbling-block in the program, which made it unacceptable to the republican faction, was the omission of any guarantee that the King would not return to Albania until after the plebiscite had been held. In view of Zog's well-established talents for maneuver, such a guarantee was considered absolutely necessary.

Another attempt was made in early January 1944 by a joint session of the local chapters of Vatra and Free Albania in Detroit at which a program was proposed including the desired guarantee. This proposal has not been accepted by the central authority of either party. At present, Vatra still adheres to the London declaration, while the governing body of Free Albania stands opposed to any plan including King Zog, and declares that the formation of a government-in-exile should be left to the decision of the guerrillas in Albania. Since, as Free Albania is well aware, the LNC is the only active guerrilla group, this decison would certainly be anti-Zog in nature.

In general, it may be said that there is at present no widespread sentiment for Zog's return. His regime was not of a nature to foster spontaneous popular support, and his record has exposed him to severe criticism on the grounds that his rule was based on oppression and graft, that he betrayed his country to the Italians, that his political assassinations were too numerous to be forgotten, and that many of the members of his despotic clique have since become quislings. Zog's relationship with Italy is a particularly strong point against him. By the time of the Italian occupation, he had lost a great deal of his support, especially among the educated Albanians, and maintained his power largely through fear of Italian intervention. Another strong point is his immediate flight at the time of the invasion. The population as a whole is reported to have been anxious to oppose the invader and to have been completely disorganized and embittered by the King's desertion.

War-weariness may, however, make him acceptable to a large number of Albanians, who will have a strong desire for security, especially if he should be returned with limited authority, and under Allied supervision. It is generally recognized, in any case, that he could not resume his rule on the old despotic basis. The Allies would find it difficult to reconcile such a regime with the Atlantic Charter, and even his staunchest adherents have realized the necessity of giving democratic assurances. It is also recognized that a plebiscite would have to be held, presumably under Allied control, since neither Zog's followers nor his opponents show any signs of allowing the people to make a free choice. Zog's future thus appears largely to depend on his willingness

to relinquish his old dictatorial powers, and on his actions in the near future. If he would guarantee to return to Albania only after a plebiscite had been held, and to accept the results of this plebiscite, the hostile factions abroad might be persuaded to forget their differences temporarily and to form a government-in-exile with the King as a figurehead, and with adequate representation of both factions. Such a government, if it were recognized as a member of the United Nations, would at least improve Zog's status with the Allies, and might partially counteract criticism of his past performances. Even as ad interim king, he could probably enhance what is already the strongest point in his favor: his position as the one unifying figure.

From the Allied point of view, however, the desirability of recognizing an Albanian government-in-exile headed by Zog is open to question. Even if anti-Zog factions abroad were convinced of his good faith, the chances of alienating the LNC are great. Like Tito's Partisans and the Greek EAM, the LNC is already distrustful of what is considers to be Allied reactionary tendencies. Nor would the participation of exiled groups be likely to carry much weight, since the rank and file of Albanians are said to be ignorant of or indifferent to the Albanian leaders abroad. Recognition of Zog might well jeopardize both the LNC's present usefulness and Allied influence in effecting a peaceful settlement after the war.

One of the strongest arguments for Zog is the scarcity of suitable alternatives. The enthronement of his infant son, Prince Skander, would necessitate a long regency, and Zog's three nephews, the only other pretenders, have no outstanding qualifications. If the Albanian people rejected Zog,

there would be little reason to accept as King either his son or a nephew except possibly as a compromise, in which case the new king would probably act as figurehead. The other alternative is some form of republican government, to which there are a number of disadvantages. Although the Albanians made some progress in the two decades before the war, they are still inexperienced in democratic processes. Illiteracy is still common; local affiliations tend to take precedence over national considerations; and there are few capable administrators. Furthermore, an already strong tendency toward disorder will undoubtedly be heightened as a result of the present hostilities. Thus a strong central government is likely to be both necessary and difficult to to achieve. If Albania is to become a republic and if that republic is to be directed toward progress, temporary inter-Allied control of the chief governmental functions will presumably be indicated.